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Abstract 
 
The primary tenet of the aircraft survivability discipline is threat definition.  In order to 
deliver relevant capabilities and protection to the warfighter it is imperative; therefore, to provide 
timely, accurate, and actionable threat data to the survivability community.  Application of this 
threat data is equally important to both new acquisition programs and long-term sustainment 
programs.  In an attempt to identify the evolution of aircraft threats in today’s combat 
environment, an analysis of fixed-wing aircraft battle damage was conducted.  This analysis 
reports aircraft battle damage incidents from OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 
and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).  Additionally, reported battle damage incidents were then 
validated by cross-referencing aircraft maintenance records from this period to eliminate non-
hostile fire data points.  Thus, only combat hostile action incidents are considered.  This 
revolutionary approach uncovered discontinuities, which were further explored to identify their 
root cause.  As a result, significant Air Force policy changes in the realm of battle damage 
reporting procedures were suggested.  The recommended changes, contained herein, are intended 
to increase the accuracy of the data presented to decision makers and the efficacy of survivability 
programs.  In the end, lives will be saved because the acquisition community at large will have 
valuable threat data in which they can be confident.   
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FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT COMBAT SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS FOR OPERATION 
ENDURING FREEDOM AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
 
I.  Introduction 
Engineers, scientists, and operators in the survivability community expend considerable 
resources trying to make sure the weapon systems fielded are safe and effective.  They build 
threat models, perform simulations, and even conduct live fire tests.  Nevertheless, when the flag 
goes up and the nation’s warriors head off to war, all efforts up to that point are largely academic.  
For those in the profession of arms who build, maintain, and sustain weapon systems, combat is 
the ultimate test.  Like all testing, the goal is to learn something.  In the survivability community, 
the goal is to learn exactly how effective their efforts to reduce an aircraft’s susceptibility and 
vulnerability have been.  In addition, they want to learn whether or not they have accurately 
predicted the threats and whether the counters to those threats are effective.  The time for the 
survivability community to gather, analyze, and disseminate combat data is now.  The U.S. is 
currently engaged in two distinct operations.  Thus, there is no better time to evaluate events.  
History has shown that if too much time is allowed to lapse between data collection and analysis, 
critical fidelity is lost.          
Survivability is not a straight-line discipline.  It is an iterative process.  Therefore, it is 
imperative that, should a nation find itself (or its products) at war, the results of the test of 
combat not be lost.  The acquisitions community uses those results to ensure modifications or 
new procurements are survivable against relevant threats.  In doing so, lives will be saved.  The 
sections to follow will briefly outline how the aircraft survivability discipline came into being. 
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1.1 Background and History  
The first use of conventional fixed-wing aircraft as an instrument of war occurred during the 
1911 Italo-Turkish War.  In the early days of the war, the Italian Army Air Corps conducted a 
bombing raid on a Turkish camp at Ain Zara, Libya.  Figure 1-1 shows a replica of a German 
monoplane fighter similar to the Italian aircraft of the period [1].  The raid marked the beginning 
for two diametrically opposed efforts.  The first effort driven by the need to defend ground (and 
later sea) based forces from attack by air and the other compelled to make aircraft survivable in 
the evermore increasingly hostile air combat environment [2].   
 
 
Figure 1-1:  Early 1900’s Era Monoplane (image courtesy of USAF) [1] 
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Aircraft survivability improvements in the early 20th century came largely as a byproduct of 
design innovations intended to increase performance parameters such as speed, altitude, payload, 
and reliability.  While attributes, such as the ability to fly relatively fast and at relatively high 
altitudes, increase survivability in their own right, they also drive the need for more robust 
structures.  Robust structural design, in-turn, leads to aircraft capable of sustaining more and 
more combat damage.  During World War I (WWI), aircraft structural design and manufacture 
took their cues from bridge building and furniture making.  Structural failures were all too 
commonplace.  Near the end of WWI, the engineers—reacting to the demands to reduce 
structural failures—developed often times overdesigned aircraft structures [3].  In 1926, the U.S. 
federal government entered the realm of aviation regulation with the creation of an aviation 
branch within the Department of Commerce.  Later the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) 
would become a department independent of the commerce department.  This precursor to the 
contemporary Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), laid the foundation for, among other 
things, minimum safety standards for aircraft design.  During this era, the Daniel Guggenheim 
Fund sponsored a “Safe Airplane Competition” for the Promotion of Aeronautics.  Primarily 
focused on low speed handling qualities and take-off and climb performance, the competition 
marked the emergence of serious efforts to solve many early aircraft design flaws.  In hindsight, 
the competition also highlighted the interconnectedness of system safety and combat 
survivability.  Unfortunately, due primarily to the widespread economic woes of the great 
depression, much of the progress made as a result of the competition was slow in finding its way 
into contemporary aircraft design [4].  Aircraft design followed a trend similar to the mid 1920’s 
during World War II (WWII) and Korea where aircraft survivability efforts were largely 
reactive.     
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For example, the Royal Air Force (RAF) first used the Boeing B-17 “Flying Fortress” in 
combat under provisions of the Lend-Lease Act of 1941.  Its design focused on the need to carry 
a relatively large internal bomb load (6,000 lbs) a distance of 1,100 miles.  To accomplish this 
goal with the technology of the time required a large internal fuel capacity inside a relatively 
lightweight airframe.  The solution involved a semimonocoque structure with a large area wing, 
which contained the necessary fuel reserves.  Survivability equipment incorporated in the early 
designs included: medium caliber machine guns for self-defense and armor for crew positions.  
Initially, the RAF employed the first twenty aircraft in daylight bombing raids over France, 
Germany, and Norway.  Without fighter escort, the relatively slow flying B-17s were highly 
susceptible to enemy fighter attack.  Unfortunately, scenes like the one found in Figure 1-2 were  
 
 
Figure 1-2:  Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress Bomber Crash, Austria, 1944, 
(image courtesy of USAF) [5] 
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all too common.  In the span of five months, eight of the original twenty B-17s were lost.  This 
prompted the RAF to withdraw the B-17s from bomber service and relegate them to coastal 
reconnaissance missions.  Boeing reacted to this by redesigning the B-17 to compensate for its 
survivability shortcomings such as inadequate crew armor and ineffective fuel tank sealing.  The 
iterative design-redesign approach continued over the next several years.  By war’s end, the 
venerable B-17, as shown in Figure 1-3, was credited as one of the key factors that led to the  
 
 
Figure 1-3:  Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress Formation, 1945, (image courtesy 
of USAF) [5] 
 
6 
 
Allied victory over the Axis powers [6].  From a systems engineering perspective the initial 
aircraft design, with all of its vulnerability issues, was a failure due to the lack of consideration 
for survivability during the early stages of development.  Subsequent redesigns corrected most of 
these problems, but costs both monetary and in human lives could have been minimized had a 
disciplined systems engineering approach —with consideration for effective survivability 
measures—been utilized from the outset. 
This is not to say that efforts to decrease aircraft vulnerability were completely nonexistent 
during WWII and the post-WWII era.  On the contrary, in 1948 representatives from all across 
the aircraft industry held the First Working Conference on Aircraft Vulnerability at the U.S. 
Army Ballistic Research Laboratory at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland.  Participants 
of the conference included subject matter experts such as representatives from: the Air Force Air 
Materiel Command, the Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University Applied 
Physics Laboratory, University of Chicago Ordnance Explosive Group, and the Rand 
Corporation.  The intent of the conference was to identify technologies necessary to reduce 
military aircraft vulnerabilities.  Sadly, the efforts initiated by the conference failed to gain 
momentum due to the belief of the time that the world would fight all future wars with nuclear 
weapons.   
This would prove to be a costly mistake during the Korean War when the U.S. military found 
itself, again, reacting to the effect of conventional weapon threats to its aircraft.  However, the 
result of the subsequent reinvigoration produced new concepts in ballistic protection, damage 
tolerant designs, and fuel (system) protection [7].     
During the war in Southeast Asia (SEA), aircraft performance increased exponentially along 
with a greater understanding of aerodynamics and structural analysis.  Correspondingly, the 
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threats military aircraft faced became more sophisticated.  From the ground, radar-guided 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) replaced the act of simply filling 
the air blindly with a curtain of lead (although flak remains a significant threat).  In air-to-air 
combat, infrared (IR) homing missiles and radar-assisted gun sights increased accuracy and the 
probability of hitting an adversary aircraft.  Unfortunately, the design process (from a 
survivability perspective) remained reactive.  The survivability improvements implemented on 
the F-4 Phantom II (Figure 1-4) illustrated this point.  The perception existed of an unacceptably  
 
 
Figure 1-4:  McDonnell Douglas (Boeing) F-4 Phantom II (image courtesy 
of USAF) [5] 
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high tactical fighter loss rate in SEA.  This perception prompted vulnerability analyses on most 
such aircraft operating in theater.  These analyses were an attempt to identify the root cause of 
the tactical fighter losses.  A United States Air Force (USAF) team determined that one of the 
major vulnerability factors in the F-4 was the lack of self-sealing fuel tanks and lines as well as 
the lack of adequate fire suppression.  Recall, that Boeing made similar upgrades to the B-17 
during WWII.  Additionally, the F-4 hydraulic system, which was necessary to operate the flight 
controls, had potential single-point failure locations.  One of these single point failure locations 
was in the empennage above the engine exhaust nozzles.  Therefore, if damage occurred in this 
or any of the other single-point failure locations, the aircraft would become uncontrollable.  To 
address the fuel system and control system issues, the USAF spent millions of dollars to retrofit 
the F-4 fleet.  This corrective action saved many aircraft and numerous lives that would have 
otherwise been lost had the retrofits not been installed [6].  If not addressed, the type of damage 
illustrated in Figure 1-5 may have caused an aircraft loss.  However, if the aircraft had designed 
for survivability against the probable threats, even fewer lives and dollars would have been lost. 
In the 1970’s, a major paradigm shift occurred when combat damage from the decades long 
conflict in Southeast Asia (SEA) was being analyzed and used to drive requirements for the next 
generation of aircraft that were being developed in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.  This act of 
analyzing actual combat data and formally applying the lessons learned to future systems marked 
the emergence of aircraft survivability as a discipline for military aircraft design.  In 1971 in 
response to a high combat aircraft loss rate in SEA the Department of Defense chartered the Joint 
Technical Coordinating Group for Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS).  Initially, their charter 
focused on susceptibility and vulnerability reduction.  In the mid-1980’s the JTCG/AS  
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Figure 1-5:  F-4 Empennage Battle Damage, courtesy of USAF [5] 
 
established the Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC).  
SURVIAC was chartered to collect and analyze historical combat data as well as threat and 
vulnerability data for all Department of Defense (DoD) agencies.  During this timeframe, the 
DoD initiated the Joint Live Fire Program.  The intent of both efforts was to provide realistic 
vulnerability test data to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  In 2003, JTCG/AS 
evolved into the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Office (JASPO) and remains the DoD’s 
primary advocate of aircraft survivability research and analysis [6].   
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JASPO provides guidance along with many other partners in the survivability community,  
which enables great strides in the enhancement of fixed-wing (and rotary-wing) aircraft 
survivability.  To institutionalize these “lessons learned,” the DoD maintains a series of military 
handbooks and standards for the acquisition community at large.  Bear in mind, the guidance 
contained within these documents was initially produced largely during the Cold War.  
Therefore, it is incumbent upon industry, the acquisition community, and the end user to 
understand what kinds of threats to consider during procurement so not to repeat the mistakes of 
past programs.  To that end, this document analyzes contemporary conflicts.   
       Following the attacks by the Islamic extremist, Al Qaeda, on September 11, 2001, the 
United States entered into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  President George W. Bush 
initiated OEF as a component of GWOT intended to disrupt terrorist training camps and 
eliminate a safe haven for terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda in the country of Afghanistan.  
A decade of war with the Soviet Union and neglect by the international community created a 
tolerant environment in Afghanistan for Al Qaeda and the ruling Taliban.  By Western standards, 
the Afghani military (i.e. the Taliban militia) did not possess equipment with high degrees of 
sophistication.  However, the proliferation of small to medium caliber guns, rocket propelled 
grenades (RPGs), and relatively inexpensive MANPADS fuels the current insurgency and poses 
a significant threat to aircraft flying in the region.  The various Afghani factions such as the 
Western backed, anti-communist Mujahedin and the Pakistani backed Taliban stockpiled these 
weapons.  Moreover, although institutionalized government-supported training regimens were 
scarce, years of experience honed on the battlefield and hands-on training make these weapons 
effective.    
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After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, hard-line Taliban finally 
filled the subsequent power vacuum after a long civil war.  Consequently, the Taliban was able 
to drive the Mujahedin, which had formed the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA), out of most 
parts of the country with the exception of the rugged northern territories.  The Taliban confined 
the ISA— more commonly known as the “Northern Alliance”— to these territories until the U.S. 
led invasion in November 2001.  At this time, the U.S. military and the Northern Alliance 
formed weak partnerships in order to overthrow the Taliban backed government.  The war in 
Afghanistan continues today along with the various threats to coalition aircraft.  Therefore, this 
document will analyze these threats to determine the most effective method for protecting U.S. 
materiel and personnel. 
         In August of 1990, the United States led coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War against 
the country of Iraq.  The United Nations (U.N.) authorized the war in response to the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraqi forces.  OPERATION DESERT STORM is the name given to the military 
response.  During DESERT STORM, coalition forces decimated the Iraqi military machine.  To 
minimize the threat of future aggression, the U.N. imposed crippling economic sanctions and 
mandated rigorous inspections of Iraq’s military infrastructure.  Following a decade of defying 
United Nations Security Council resolutions requiring the country of Iraq to dismantle its 
weapons of mass (WMD) programs; allow verification inspections; and cease and desist hostile 
actions against coalition aircraft patrolling the northern and southern no-fly zones—the U.S. 
invaded Iraq in March 2003.  The military name for this action became known as OPERATION 
IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).   In contrast to Afghanistan, Iraq had a strong (autocratic) 
government, somewhat well established infrastructure, and a reasonably well trained and 
equipped military.  Previously, during OPERATION DESERT STORM, Iraqi integrated air 
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defense systems (IADS) had been severely damaged and subsequent sanctions left them in 
serious disrepair.  The extent of its capabilities was unknown at the beginning of OIF.  Military 
planners knew, although diminished, the Iraqi military threat to U.S. and coalition warplanes 
remained significant.  Therefore, early in OIF significant coalition efforts were concentrated on 
gaining air superiority.  Following the initial invasion and defeat of the standing Iraqi military, 
the campaign devolved into a large-scale insurgency and shares similarity with the hostile action 
in Afghanistan.  Unlike Afghanistan; however, Iraqi military personnel were well organized and 
trained on the weapon systems in their possession prior to the U.S. led invasion.  Therefore, after 
the toppling of the official Iraqi government and dissolution of the military, many of these 
personnel became members of the insurgency.  Supplied by regional proxies and motivated by 
self-preservation the insurgents employ firepower and continually evolve their tactics with 
devastating effect.  Although devoid of complicated IADS networks—small arms, RPGs, and 
MANPADS continue to threaten U.S. and coalition aircraft 
       
1.2 Research Objectives 
The primary objective of this research is to save lives by increasing the combat survivability 
of fixed-wing aircraft in current and future operations.  The author accomplishes this objective 
by analyzing trends in combat damage from the most recent data sets available.  The larger 
aircraft survivability [and acquisitions] community can use these trends to reduce susceptibility 
and decrease vulnerability.    
Due to design improvements driven by lessons learned over nearly a century of combat 
aviation, an aircraft damaged does not necessarily equate to an aircraft kill.  As a secondary 
objective, this research explores aircraft battle damage reporting procedures and repair guidance.  
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Finally, it is the goal of this thesis to provide constructive recommendations for these processes.  
The improved aircraft battle damage processes will provide timely, accurate, and actionable 
information to all necessary stakeholders.   
Why is this research important?  The USAF is currently developing high-profile acquisition 
programs such as the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightening II with survivability features intended to 
offset threats encountered during large state versus state conflicts.  Such conflicts would require 
state of the art stealth technology, net-centric command and control, precision attack capability, 
and unparalleled aircraft performance to overcome highly sophisticated integrated air defense 
systems (IADS).  Both OEF and OIF have shown that once allied forces have established air 
superiority, the fight continues.  Additionally, this document will show that even the most 
advanced aircraft of the day remains vulnerable.  Therefore, the answer to the question of why 
this research is important is to highlight omnipresent vulnerabilities.  Armed with this 
knowledge, leaders in the operational and acquisition communities can make informed choices to 
defend man and materiel from harm—even in conflicts where a substantial technological 
advantage over the enemy may exist.          
A commonly used expression in the military is, “Low risk does not mean—no risk.”  To 
quantify this risk, acquisitions professionals utilize a risk assessment matrix like the one found in 
Figure 1-6.  Despite the best efforts of the survivability community, the likelihood of an aircraft 
experiencing some form of damage (susceptibility) during combat is high.  While avoiding 
damage altogether pays the highest dividends from a risk mitigation perspective, it is also 
important to identify methods to minimize the consequences of damage (vulnerability).  From an 
aircraft survivability perspective, if damage occurs, warfighters hope the aircraft design is such 
that it is capable of completing the mission and returning to base safely.  However, the  
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Figure 1-6: Risk Assessment Matrix 
 
threat essentially killed the aircraft if it is unable to fly another mission.  During OPERATION 
DESERT STORM, a single AC-130 gunship was lost to hostile fire.  The loss of this aircraft 
represented twenty-five percent of the gunships deployed for the operation.  Furthermore, if 
propagated for the entire campaign, this event would cause the loss rate for AC-130s to spike to 
nearly 10 per 1,000 sorties [10].  Clearly, such a loss rate is unsustainable.  In addition to the 
need to decrease aircraft vulnerability, this example emphasizes how losing a relatively low 
number of aircraft can affect a deployed force’s strength.  Therefore, given the high probability 
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that aircraft will sustain combat damage and the impact a single aircraft loss has on campaign 
survivability; it is foolhardy not to plan for such scenarios. 
Contingency planning should thus be focused on the ability to generate equal numbers of 
sorties with fewer aircraft; thereby, minimizing the required logistical footprint without 
sacrificing combat capability.  In the current environment, dependence on tenuous relationships 
with host nations influences strategic planning.  Therefore, the ability to provide needed 
airpower using the minimum number of aircraft is all the more vital.  This fact was evident in the 
highly publicized negotiation for the use of Manas AB, Kyrgyzstan.  In early 2009, the Kyrgyz 
government agreed to allow the United States to continue operations if, in-turn, the U.S. would 
agree to a three-fold increase in rent for the facilities.  Therefore, yet another benefit of this 
research is to identify ABDR focus areas on which leaders should concentrate resources in order 
to produce maximum aircraft availability using the minimum number of aircraft.  One such focus 
area is aircraft design that eliminates the need for immediate repair.  Current ABDR technical 
data exists for most combat aircraft in the active USAF inventory.  This technical data identifies 
categories of damage, with which the aircraft can continue to operate unrepaired.  By 
recognizing trends in aircraft battle damage from OEF and OIF from an ABDR perspective, it is 
possible to incorporate—early in the weapon system design process—damage tolerant structures, 
which enable rapid repair or preclude the need for repair altogether.  This enables combatant 
commanders to efficiently generate and sustain airpower with limited assets.   
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II. Literature Review 
As illustrated in Figure 2-1, aircraft survivability is a balance between the threats posed by an 
adversary and a weapon system’s survivability features.  Most importantly, aircraft survivability 
hinges on mission requirements.  This chapter intends to provide the reader with a brief overview 
of the aircraft survivability discipline.  Additionally, this chapter introduces several key 
components of the battle damage reporting process.  The components include assessors who 
gather information, analysts responsible for processing information, and consumers who apply 
the lessons learned in order to make weapon systems more survivable.  The goal of this chapter 
is to provide a framework of understanding for the research methodology presented in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Figure 2-1:  Aircraft Survivability Balance  
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2.1 The Aircraft Combat Survivability Discipline 
Dr. Robert Ball defines aircraft combat survivability as the capability of an aircraft to avoid 
or withstand a man-made hostile environment.  He further subdivides survivability into 
susceptibility: the inability of an aircraft to avoid a man-made hostile environment and 
vulnerability: the inability of an aircraft to withstand the man-made hostile environment.  The 
antithesis of survivability is killability.  If an aircraft is susceptible and vulnerable to a man-made 
hostile environment (a specific threat type), then it is killable.  Aircraft combat survivability is a 
quantifiable.  To quantifying survivability, one must calculate probabilistic values for events that 
would lead to an aircraft kill.  Therefore, the probability that an aircraft is survivable (PS) is the 
complement of the probability that an aircraft is killable (PK), Equation 1.   
Thus, 
        PS = 1 – PK  (1) 
   Survivability = 1 – Killability      
 
      As alluded to earlier, killability is composed of two components—susceptibility and 
vulnerability.  From an aircraft combat survivability perspective, susceptibility is the probability 
that an aircraft is hit (PH) by a given threat—i.e. it cannot avoid the man-made hostile 
environment.  Similarly, the probability that an aircraft is killed assuming it is hit (PK|H) defines 
vulnerability.  Probabilistically, the product of these values is equivalent to killability (Equation 
2.)  Hence, 
                                                                    PK = PH · PK|H  (2) 
Killability = Susceptibility · Vulnerability 
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Thus, the combination of Equations 1 and 2 yield Equation 3.        
          PS = 1– PK = 1– PH · PK|H  (3) 
Survivability = 1 – Killability = 1 – Susceptibility · Vulnerability 
 
An aircraft's ability to avoid the man-made hostile environment is the complement of 
susceptibility (PcH).  Similarly, the degree an aircraft can withstand a particular man-made hostile 
environment is the complement of vulnerability (PcK|H).  Therefore, survivability is as follows: 
           PS = PcH + PH · PcK|H  (4) 
Survivability = Complement of Susceptibility + Susceptibility · Complement of Vulnerability 
 
Figure 2-2 illustrates the kill chain for a single aircraft versus a single shot from a single threat.  
Note that the threat does not necessarily have to be ground based.  The above discussion raises 
the important question of how to assign values to the subject probabilities.  Such probability 
values are highly dependent on the details of given scenario [6].  For example, consider the 
ludicrous example of a fly versus sledgehammer.  Obviously, the fly is extremely vulnerable to 
the impact of a sledgehammer; therefore, the PK|H must be equal to one.  Consequently, the 
survivability of the fly is dependent on its ability to avoid the sledgehammer—its susceptibility.  
For the sledgehammer to be a threat, it must be active; able to detect the fly; track the fly; initiate 
a swing toward the fly; and finally squash the fly.  When combined with PK|H these factors 
describe the links of the so-called “kill chain” (the red arrow in Figure 2-2.)  If any single link in 
the kill chain is disrupted the fly will survive the scenario.  This is equivalent to following a 
green arrow on the in Figure 2-2.  The kill chain is also broken into phases.  The phases, shown 
in blue, mark the transition from one stage of the scenario to another. 
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Figure 2-2:  One vs. One Kill Chain (Single Shot), taken from [6] 
 
 In a scenario analogous to the fly vs. sledgehammer, to kill an aircraft the exact same chain 
of events must occur.  Figure 2-3, notionally depicts the kill chain for a hypothetical scenario.  
Figure 2-3 is identical to Figure 2-2 except realistic descriptions for the event phases are used.  In 
this scenario, a single insurgent armed with a small caliber rifle lies in wait along an aircraft’s 
flight path.  The flight path is on the approach to a forward operating base with an unimproved 
runway.  From an aircraft defense perspective, designers should focus on disrupting the kill chain 
at any point possible.  To prevent, for example, the insurgent from actively searching for aircraft 
to fire upon, increased security patrols may be necessary.  In turn, this reduces the overall PK for 
the scenario. 
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Figure 2-3:  Hypothetical Kill Chain Illustrating an Insurgent vs. Aircraft, 
Single Shot Scenario 
      
 The purpose of this extremely brief introduction to the aircraft combat survivability 
discipline is to identify events leading up to the vulnerability phase of a given scenario.  It is 
important to understand that, while the research contained herein focuses mainly on aircraft 
vulnerability, the ability to break the kill chain prior to the vulnerability phase is equally 
important.  Additionally, assignment of probability values is not, by any means, arbitrary.  
Engineers conduct extensive research to define threat capability and aircraft susceptibility and 
vulnerability.  Additionally, researchers perform exhaustive modeling and simulation to predict 
21 
 
real world performance of these systems.  Without this important work, survivability as a formal 
discipline would be less concise.   
  
2.2 Aircraft Battle Damage Repair Evolution 
In the example presented in Figure 2-2, there is an important caveat.  An aircraft can 
potentially be hit but not killed.  Such a condition defines the complement of the probability of 
kill given a hit on the aircraft (PcK│H).  Assume the aircraft in the hypothetical scenario returns to 
base with battle damage.  If maintainers cannot return the aircraft to mission capable status, the 
result is an aircraft kill.  This factor is the source for development of aircraft battle damage repair 
(ABDR).  The need to perform ABDR existed from the earliest days of aerial combat.  Over 
time, a number of repair philosophies evolved.  However, the goal of ABDR, regardless of 
philosophy, is to generate and sustain combat airpower.   
 The aircraft involved in WWI were very simple by current aerospace standards.  
Consequently, if a warplane of that era sustained battle damage, it was likely a total loss.  
However, there are records of simple repairs performed during this period.  Advances in aircraft 
design during WWII vastly increased performance and cost.  Aircraft of the WWII period, 
therefore, required more involved repair schemes in order to operate effectively and, because of 
the higher costs involved, were much less expendable than WWI era aircraft.  It was during 
WWII that two distinct ABDR philosophies emerged.  The first philosophy utilized rapid, 
temporary repairs in order to provide the highest number of combat capable aircraft in the 
shortest amount of time.  The second philosophy, which emerged relied heavily upon a well-
established logistics infrastructure.  The infrastructure enabled field-level repairs to be 
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accomplished using original equipment parts.  If technicians deemed repairs to be above a field-
level repair threshold, they shipped the aircraft to depots.  In both cases, the result was aircraft in 
like-new condition.  Either philosophy has its uses in modern aerial warfare.  If time allows, it is 
certainly more advantageous to have aircraft in pristine condition.  However, when fighting a 
war of attrition, the ability to rapidly return aircraft to the fight becomes a force multiplier.  If a 
damaged aircraft returns to base, yet technicians cannot repair it in time to contribute to the 
campaign it is, in essence, a dead aircraft. 
 During hostilities in SEA, ABDR came of age out of necessity.  For the first time the DoD 
formally captured damage, loss, and repair data.  The data showed combat losses were becoming 
untenable and deployed maintenance operations were overwhelmed.  In response, the depots 
built teams of civil service technicians and engineers that would deploy into combat zones to 
perform depot-level repairs and ABDR.  Later, in response to the drawbacks of deploying 
civilians into a combat zone, the USAF formed all-military teams dubbed Combat Logistics 
Support Squadrons (CLSSs).  Depot repair teams, including CLSS and specially trained ABDR 
engineers, reconstituted an estimated 1,000 of SEA’s 11,800 battle-damaged aircraft [11]. 
 In the post-SEA era, CLSS and depot engineers built upon the lessons learned and further 
institutionalized ABDR training.  This training paid dividends during Operation Desert Storm 
with significant increases in aircraft availability.  Following Desert Storm, CLSS and the formal 
ABDR program remained largely unchanged for most of the 1990’s.  Air Force Instruction (AFI) 
21-101, AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT drives Air Force 
Materiel Command (AFMC) to the requirement to have a robust ABDR program.   
 In 1997, the United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) Committee on United 
States Air Force Expeditionary Forces produced a report outlining a new vision for employing 
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global airpower.  The resulting combination of operation concepts; systems; technology and 
training; and organizational changes lays the foundation for the Aerospace Expeditionary Force 
(AEF) concept.  The report defines AEFs as follows: 
 
Aerospace Expeditionary Forces are tailorable and rapidly employable air and 
space assets that provide the National Command Authority and the theater 
commanders-in-chief with desired outcomes for a spectrum of missions ranging 
from humanitarian relief to joint or combined combat operations.  [12] 
 
The SAB report also identified what it terms as the necessary “keys” for the AEF vision to be 
successful.  Figure 2-4 illustrates the interconnectedness of the keys to the AEF vision.  The core 
competencies of the Air Force: air and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, 
precision engagement, information superiority, and agile combat support remain unchanged.  
However, the keys defined a pathway by which the USAF could maintain its core competencies 
with a leaner more efficient force.  Of particular interest is the concept of the AEF being “light.”  
Being light means that an AEF will deploy only what is necessary to accomplish the intended 
mission.  For example, the USAF would only deploy the essential operational, command, 
support, and force protection assets with an AEF in an effort to minimize the necessary logistical 
footprint.  For an AEF to be light, especially from an aircraft maintenance perspective, it must 
also adopt a Lean Logistics (LL) philosophy.  LL is a concept developed by the RAND 
Corporation to deal with the problem of uncertainty of demand for products and services used by 
maintenance organizations.   
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Figure 2-4: Keys to the AEF Vision, taken from [12] 
 
The SAB report outlines what it calls the “Key elements of the LL concept.”  The elements are 
as follows: 
• Significant acceleration of both organic repairs, addressed by the Depot Repair 
Enhancement Program (D-REP), and contractor repairs, addressed by a 
matching Contractor REP (C-REP) 
• Reliable and rapid (time-definite) transportation between engaged forces and 
sources of supply 
• Information systems that provide the necessary connectivity to the logistics 
support system including transmission of field failure data to accompany returned 
items 
• Ways to rapidly fabricate items not in stock, especially older items whose 
original source is no longer available 
• Continuous improvement based on results of exercises and field experience [12] 
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 As the Air Force entered the new millennium, it implemented the recommendations of the 
Scientific Advisory Board report.  OEF and later OIF put the effectiveness of these 
recommendations to the test.  However, what effect does the AEF construct have on ABDR?  
Relatively speaking, OEF and OIF have required very little support from ABDR specialists 
because air superiority was rapidly established.  Therefore, following the AEF philosophy, there 
was no need to deploy CLSS as part of the overall force package.  The unintended consequence 
of this fact is the perception that ABDR is not as relevant today as it was in the past and their 
skills are not in high demand.  Compounded with budgetary constraints, this mindset has forced 
drastic reductions in the ABDR program.  These reductions; however, are contradictory to 
significant elements of the AEF vision.  For example, the SAB report suggests that the ability to 
significantly accelerate depot repairs and fabricate items not in stock were elements key to LL 
success.  This is a crucial capability possessed by the CLSS.  Additionally, the SAB report points 
to a reduced demand on maintenance personnel to perform routine maintenance.  This, in-turn, 
enables leaders to task AEF personnel with determining the most efficient means of returning 
battle damaged aircraft to some level of functionality.  This too is a capability possessed by 
CLSS.  Therefore, the reduction of CLSS to expeditionary maintenance (EDMX) flights with 
only a fraction of their previous manpower and capabilities is contrary to core recommendations 
of the 1997, United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) Committee on United 
States Air Force Expeditionary Forces report.  Moreover, the manner in which the USAF 
implemented the AEF system has other unintended consequences.  Later chapters explore these 
issues in more detail.  However, at this point, understand that maintenance personnel are a key 
component in the effort to gather battle damage information.   
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2.3 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)  
One of the primary stakeholders in the aircraft survivability community is DOT&E.  In 
accordance with Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 139, the President of the United States shall, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint a Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.  
By the authority of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) the DOT&E defines policies and 
procedures used to conduct operational test and evaluation for all branches of the DoD; provides 
guidance to the SECDEF, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 
(USD/A&TL), and the Secretaries of military departments with respect to OT&E; coordinate 
Joint OT&E; monitor and review all DoD OT&E activities; make recommendations to the 
SECDEF regarding OT&E financial matters; and monitor and review all DoD LFT&E [13]. 
Currently, the DOT&E has defined four key initiatives.  These initiatives are as follows: 
1. Field new capability rapidly.   
2. Engage early and improve requirements 
3. Integrate developmental, live fire, and operational testing 
4. Substantially improve suitability before initial OT&E [13]    
Initiative 1, harkens back to the reactive nature of design for survivability.  To some extent, 
survivability will always be one-step behind the current threat.  Threats are constantly evolving.  
Therefore, researchers should conduct survivability studies and present the results to the 
survivability community as soon as feasible.  As such, timely, accurate, and actionable—and 
thereby relevant—information is the key to fielding new technology more rapidly.  Researchers 
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must also disseminate results as widely as prudent.  Such research ensures all stakeholders have 
applicable data on current threats and fulfill DOT&E initiatives two and three.  Moreover, live 
fire test and evaluation (LFT&E), required by law (U.S. code Title 10, Section 2366), falls under 
the purview of DOT&E.  The objective of LFT&E as defined by the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook (DAG) is as follows:  
The objective of Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) is to provide a timely 
assessment of the vulnerability/lethality of a system as it progresses through its 
design and development prior to full-rate production.  In particular, LFT&E 
should accomplish the following:  
• Provide information to decision-makers on potential user casualties, 
vulnerabilities, and lethality, taking into equal consideration 
susceptibility to attack and combat performance of the system; 
• Ensure that knowledge of user casualties and system vulnerabilities or 
lethality is based on testing of the system under realistic combat 
conditions; 
• Allow any design deficiency identified by the testing and evaluation to 
be corrected in design or employment before proceeding beyond low-
rate initial production; and 
• Assess recoverability from battle damage and battle damage repair 
capabilities and issues. 
The LFT&E Strategy for a given system should be structured and scheduled so 
that any design changes resulting from the testing and analysis, described in the 
LFT&E Strategy, may be incorporated before proceeding beyond low-rate initial 
production.  [14]  
 
DOT&E has the authority to designate any new or existing program for LFT&E oversight.  If so 
designated, the program becomes a “covered system.”  The ability of DOT&E to accomplish the 
outlined objectives hinges on the ability to precisely define the threats to aircraft or aircraft 
systems and defining what constitutes survival.  These definitions must be in place early in the 
acquisition process.  Doing so ensures that all parties understand the requirements and prevents 
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duplication of labor.  Finally, as with all aspects of system development, accurately defining 
suitability requirements as early in the process as possible increases the degree to which the end 
user can satisfactorily field a system.  To accomplish this goal, DOT&E produces an annual 
report, which outlines deficiencies and successes of covered systems.  With regard to 
survivability, DOT&E must define success against a relevant threat.  Therefore, DOT&E is a 
major consumer of battle damage analysis.      
2.4 Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) 
As mentioned earlier in this document, JASP evolved from the Joint Technical Coordinating 
Group for Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS) and is the Department of Defense’s (DoD) focal 
point for joint service enhancement of military aircraft non-nuclear survivability. 
The commanders of the USN Naval Air Systems Command, USA Aviation and Missile 
Command, and USAF Aeronautical Systems Center charter the JASP.  It coordinates and 
conducts RDT&E to improve military aircraft survivability; develops and standardizes aircraft 
survivability modeling and simulation (M&S); facilitates information exchange on aircraft 
survivability; and supports aircraft survivability education for the DoD and U.S. aircraft 
community.  Each chartering command provides a senior aircraft survivability expert for the 
JASP Principal Members Steering Group (PMSG), which guides the program and approves 
projects for funding.  The JASP assesses and reports on combat damage incidents through the 
Joint Combat Assessment Team (JCAT); is the Executive Agent for the Joint Live Fire Aircraft 
Systems Program managed by the Live Fire Test office of DOT&E; and is also an Executive 
Agent for the Survivability Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC), the 
repository for aircraft survivability information [16].  To better understand the organizational 
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relationship between the listed organizations refer to Figure 2-5.  JASPO is a critical node for 
battle damage information.  Their members are involved in all phases (collection, compiling, and 
consuming) of the battle damage information flow.  
Organizationally JCAT supports the JASPO mission.  JCAT is comprised of assessors from 
the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.  The DoD specifically trains JCAT members to  
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Figure 2-5: JASPO Organization, taken from [6] 
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conduct combat damage forensics and assessments on battle-damaged aircraft.  To perform these 
evaluations, team members are often required to forward deploy.  Training consists of three 
phases.  ASDAT hosts phase one at Fort Rucker, AL.  Phase one consists of basic combat  
damage forensics.  During this phase, future assessors learn how to identify damage associated 
with specific threat weapon types.  Phase two, conducted at China Lake Naval Air Warfare  
Center in California, continues the assessors training on actual fixed wing and rotary wing 
aircraft used in weapons live fire tests and evaluations.  This provides hands-on experience to the 
assessors in analyzing real world damage caused by representative threat types.  Phase three—
the Threat Weapons and Effects seminar.  During this phase of training, assessors receive 
classified briefings on current threat weapons and their effects.  The capstone of the seminar, and 
the final component of JCAT training, is live-fire exhibition with a follow-on assessment [17].  
JCAT’s mission is to assess the threat environment for operational commanders and collect data 
to support aircraft survivability research and development. 
Like JCAT, SURVIAC supports the JASPO mission.  Furthermore, SURVIAC is the DoD 
focal point for survivability data.  Their capabilities include the development of vulnerability 
data; modeling and simulation; threat weapon analysis; and U.S. weapon effectiveness.  
SURVIAC is the primary recipient of combat damage and loss data.  Through JASPO, 
SURVIAC is also involved in analyzing live-fire test results.  Three distinct entities— JCAT, 
Combat Logistics Support Squadrons (CLSSs), and operational units collect aircraft battle 
damage data, which is routed to SURVIAC.  Each group has their own specific mission.  CLSS 
and the operational unit’s mission differs from that of JCAT in that instead of ultimately trying to 
identify the threat for intelligence purposes, their mandate is to return the aircraft to flying status 
as soon as possible.  CLSS possesses special skills, unavailable to typical maintenance units, to 
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help facilitate this mandate.  Regardless, Technical Order (TO) 1-1H-39 requires that all aircraft 
battle damage be reported.  The data captured by JCAT members is catalogued in CDIRS and 
data captured by CLSS and maintenance units is recorded on AFTO FORM 97/A.  When 
notified of an incident, JCAT (or CLSS) team members rapidly mobilize to capture as much 
detail about the incident as possible.  A crucial component of the investigation and ensuing 
report is the aircrew interview.  As such, it is important to interview the aircrew as soon as 
possible because their memories lose fidelity with time.  During the interview, debrief section 
members record specifics surrounding the incident such as altitude, airspeed, fuel load, heading, 
countermeasures employed, etc.  When assessors inspect the aircraft, they look for clues to 
determine what type of threat the aircraft encountered.  Threat types include (but are not limited 
to) the following: small arms/automatic weapons (SA/AWs), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), 
and other man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).  Finally, assessors compile and 
upload the information in the SURVIAC database for further analysis.  For reasons discussed 
later, operational units are often times unaware of the requirement to capture and submit aircraft 
battle damage information to SURVIAC.  However, some aircraft repair documentation may 
capture battle damage indirectly.  Figure 2-6 illustrates the ideal flow of battle damage 
information through SURVIAC from those charged with collection to the end users. 
In summary, field units such as ABDR teams, JCAT, or operational maintenance units collect 
battle damage information.  The units then forward the information to SURVIAC for analysis.  
JASPO communicates the battle damage data and analysis from SURVIAC to a variety of 
aircraft survivability stakeholders.  Such stakeholders include DOT&E, weapon system 
developers, etc.  Exercising the principles of the aircraft survivability discipline, the stakeholders 
ensure new and existing acquisition programs are survivable against real-world threats. 
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III.  Methodology 
In principle, the research methodology in this document is quite straightforward.  Battle 
damage data, provided by SURVIAC (and other sources) to the Institute for Defense Analysis 
(IDA), is readily available.  Furthermore, IDA has already invested significant resources to the 
process of scrutinizing the data.  Not only is the data available its validity is widely respected 
within the larger aircraft survivability community.  Therefore, step one is to mine the fixed-wing 
dataset available to identify battle damage trends.  The approach involves looking at the battle 
damage from two perspectives.  Perspective one looks at battle damage based on the aircraft 
involved in a particular combat event.  The second perspective looks at battle damage based on 
the threat type involved in the same combat events as in perspective one.  Concentrations of 
incidents from either one of these perspectives (or both), in theory, highlights fertile areas in 
which analysis is warranted.  The second step requires crosschecking specific incidents against a 
second (or potentially a third) database to get as much detail as possible about the event.  Finally, 
having identified battle damage trends and obtained situational awareness about specific events, 
the author makes recommendations to improve aircraft survivability.  The following sections 
provide details about the three databases used and about the process used to further refine the 
scope of this research.        
3.1 Information Databases 
The primary objective of this thesis, as outlined in section 1.2, is to increase combat 
survivability of fixed-wing aircraft and thereby save lives.  Therefore, it is necessary to examine 
aircraft damages and losses attributed to combat; determine aircraft susceptibility and 
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vulnerability concerns; identify combat damage/loss trends; and make recommendations that 
accomplish the stated objectives.  To this end, this document utilizes three databases.  The 
databases are as follows: “Study on Rotorcraft Survivability”; Reliability and Maintainability 
Maintenance Information System (REMIS); and Combat Damage Incident Reporting System 
(CDIRS).  It is important to note that the rotorcraft study mentioned and CDIRS are somewhat 
interrelated.  SURVIAC, as the single DoD agency responsible for managing aircraft battle 
damage data, provided the bulk of the material used to produce the rotorcraft study.  Meanwhile, 
CDIRS is a relatively new tool, also managed by SURVIAC, used to facilitate collection of 
current and future battle damage.  In essence, the rotorcraft survivability study represents a 
historic composite of aircraft battle damage from various sources and CDIRS enables its users to 
conduct similar studies now and into the future.            
As part of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, 
Public Law 110-417, Congress commissioned Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to produce a 
study on DoD rotorcraft survivability.  IDA is a non-profit corporation that operates three 
federally funded research and development centers to provide objective analyses of national 
security issues, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise, and conduct related 
research on other national challenges [18].  The scope of this study was broad and included all 
rotorcraft losses during the OEF/OIF timeframe defined as October 2001 to December 2008.  
The analysis was supported by review of combat data reports from SEA era and by Class A 
mishap reports from 1985-2008.  The study distinguishes aircraft losses from fatalities associated 
with aircraft losses.  The reasoning for this approach is to identify potential solutions with the 
type of loss (airframe or personnel) they intend to prevent.  Because the overall timeframe 
included in the study was so protracted (1962 to present), losses were subdivided into three 
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categories: Combat Hostile Action—hostile fire involved; Combat Non-Hostile Action—hostile 
fire not involved; and Non-Combat—mishap outside of combat zone. 
The study found that in OEF/OIF, for rotary-wing aircraft, the contemporary combat hostile 
action loss rate was six times better than SEA.  Specifically, helicopter losses due to small arms 
fire was significantly less.  However, Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) and 
rocket propelled grenades (RPGs)/rockets account for 70 percent of rotary-wing combat hostile 
action losses.  The study goes on to compare the hostile action and non-hostile action rates and 
indicates that both regimes are fertile areas for improving the survivability of rotary-wing 
aircraft.  From a hostile fire perspective, the study found that rotary-wing aircraft are especially 
vulnerable to threats from MANPADS and RPGs.  Therefore, to reduce combat hostile action 
losses the recommendation was made to increase investment in technologies that will improve 
situational awareness; detect and defeat guided and unguided threats; and enhance damage 
tolerance [19].   
The premise of the argument that spawned the rotorcraft survivability study was that, 
compared to fixed-wing aircraft, rotorcraft survivability improvements were lagging.  Therefore, 
to determine whether the premise was true or false, it was necessary to study fixed-wing losses 
from the same time.  Because of this requirement, the survivability community at large considers 
the rotorcraft survivability study to be the most comprehensive single source of aircraft battle 
damage statistics to date, both fixed-wing and rotorcraft.  Consequently, this thesis will rely 
heavily on the fixed-wing data presented in the “Study on Rotorcraft Survivability.”  Chapter 4 
further discusses the details from the cited study, with regard to fixed-wing aircraft.  The primary 
focus of the rotorcraft study, as the name implies, is improvements to rotorcraft survivability.  
Conversely, the focus of this thesis is improving fixed-wing aircraft survivability, which “spins” 
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the point of view.  This approach provides a fresh analytical perspective that is especially useful 
when dealing with a well-known database.  Thus, the author is able to scrutinize and evaluate the 
data set with an open mind.   
Evidence of this fresh perspective is the revolutionary approach of using typical maintenance 
databases, such as Reliability and Maintainability Maintenance Information System (REMIS), to 
validate the battle damage database.  Air Force Technical Order (TO) 00-20-2, section 2-2.1 
states that the purpose of REMIS is [to] accumulate data and provide information necessary to 
support the Air Force equipment maintenance program outlined in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 
21-101.  REMIS provides accurate, near-real-time data accessibility to all levels of management 
[20].  Information captured in REMIS includes aircraft MDS, serial number (i.e. tail number), 
work unit code (WUC), how malfunctions were identified (how malfunction code), and 
discrepancy narratives.  Of particular importance is the so-called how malfunction code.  Aircraft 
battle damage carries a how malfunction code of 731.  Therefore, REMIS can be data mined for 
all actions associated with how malfunction code 731 and, theoretically, the returns should be 
maintenance actions resulting from an aircraft battle damage incident.  Note that the primary 
purpose of REMIS is to identify maintenance man-hour and material usage data—not necessarily 
to track battle damage trends.  To better understand the interconnectedness of REMIS with the 
maintenance and sustainment functions see Figure 3-1.  Ultimately, REMIS is a repository of 
maintenance related information used by various agencies to maintain and improve aircraft 
availability.  However, when used properly REMIS can provide information, which validates 
battle damage reports and provides quantifiable mission impacts. 
The third database used to crosscheck trends from the rotorcraft study is the Combat Damage 
Incident Reporting System (CDIRS).  SURVIAC is the arm of JASPO tasked with cataloguing,  
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Figure 3-1: Aircraft Maintenance Data Flow 
 
analyzing, and distributing battle damage information.  Historically, operational USAF units 
captured the majority of battle damage information on Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) Form 
97.  Units then routed the paper AFTO 97 through the proper channels to SURVIAC located at 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH.  Upon arrival, an analyst examined the document and 
captured pertinent information electronically.  This process, though extremely important to the 
survivability community and still in use today, suffers from inefficiency.  In June 2005, CDIRS 
was developed.  Managed by SURVIAC, the Combat Damage Incident Reporting System 
(CDIRS) serves as a database for all combat damage incidents.  CDIRS is a web-based interface 
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designed to meet the needs of JCAT and ASDAT to distribute, store, edit, search, view, and 
discuss combat damage information within a centralized environment.  Members of JCAT and 
the U.S. Army’s Aircraft Shoot Down Assessment Team (ASDAT) input information gathered 
through on-site investigations of the actual battle damage.  Information catalogued includes 
aircraft type, threat type, incident date, aircraft component damage, damage effects, etc.  
SURVIAC, in-turn, disseminates this information to tacticians and other users.  After securing 
funds in the 2007 timeframe, SURVIAC upgraded CDIRS to allow a variety of aircraft 
survivability stakeholders to disseminate and analyze its data.  The level of detail recorded about 
each incident is of high enough fidelity to warrant classification.  Battle damage information 
prior to the implementation of CDIRS is not available through the web-based interface at this 
time.  Fortunately, the personnel at SURVIAC have done yeoman’s work ensuring the most 
comprehensive and useful database of battle damage is available to the survivability community.  
Because the scope of this analysis begins in 2001, CDIRS data is of limited value.  However, if 
SURVIAC further institutionalizes its use, CDIRS will be an invaluable asset for the future of 
aircraft survivability. 
3.2 Scope Refinement 
  Figure 3-2 shows the subdivision of rotary-wing and fixed-wing combat damage incidents 
from OEF and OIF.  From this graphic, rotorcraft are an order of magnitude more likely to 
sustain combat damage than their fixed-wing counterparts working in the same area of 
responsibility.  Therefore, further examination of rotorcraft survivability would seem to be in 
order.  This fact is precisely why Congress commissioned IDA to perform the “Study of  
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Figure 3-2: Aircraft Battle Damage Subdivisions 
 
Rotorcraft Survivability” from which a significant portion of the data presented in this document 
is sourced.  Since IDA conducted a thorough study of rotorcraft survivability, the author chose to 
explore fixed-wing survivability.  The task is daunting.  There are entire organizations whose 
sole purpose is the analysis of combat data, albeit with different goals.  It was necessary; 
therefore, to refine the scope of this thesis into something more manageable within a finite 
timeframe.  For this task, the author examines the rotorcraft study to identify potential areas on 
which to focus.  Since the subject of this document is fixed-wing aircraft survivability, the initial 
step was to extract all relevant fixed-wing data.  The resulting subset of information was broken 
into the following aircraft categories: Tactical fighter aircraft (TACAIR), Tactical Airlift, and 
Strategic Airlift.  Figure 3-2 contains a graphic, which illustrates how the aircraft battle damage 
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compilation was subdivided.  For the purposes of this study, TACAIR is any aircraft that carries 
an F or A designator (e.g. F-16, A-10, etc.)  Tactical airlift is any aircraft whose primary mission 
involves intra-theater airlift.  Such aircraft tend to be multiengine turboprop powered cargo 
aircraft (e.g. C-23, C-130, etc.)  Finally, strategic airlift is any aircraft whose primary function is 
global mobility (e.g. C-17, C-5, commercial airliners, etc.)  For consistency, the definition of 
these categories closely resembles the definitions found in the rotorcraft study.  The rotorcraft 
survivability study also includes damages and losses as a result of mishaps and indirect fire 
incidents.  Mishaps are events, which result in a loss or damaged aircraft and are not a result of 
enemy fire.  Indirect fire incidents are events where an aircraft is damaged or lost because of 
enemy fire while on the ground (e.g. during a mortar attack).  This research does not present 
these two categories of damage.  These categories are important.  Indirect fire and mishap 
damage certainly affect a unit’s ability to generate and sustain airpower.  For this study; 
however, the goal is to produce recommendations that increase aircraft survivability during 
combat operations.  Therefore, recommendations stemming from this research, which increases 
survivability during combat operations will likely have a positive outcome relative to these 
omitted categories. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
For clarification, combat hostile action damage and combat hostile action losses are incidents 
that occur as a direct result of hostile fire, while engaged in a prescribed mission.  It bears 
repeating that mishaps and/or indirect fire damage is not included in these numbers.  In this 
context, battle damage and combat damage incidents (CDIs) are synonymous.  However, this is 
not always the case.  The latter part of this section discusses, in detail, the definition of battle 
damage.  The discussion intends to highlight the nuance between battle damage and combat 
damage. 
The initial scope of the research presented in this document was broad.  This was intentional 
due to the relatively small fixed-wing aircraft battle damage sample size.  The hope was to 
present research that identifies a particular vulnerability and highlights potential material 
solutions.  During the course of this research; however, the findings indicated something more 
dubious.  There were inconsistencies in the research databases.  As a result, the analysis focus 
evolved to include the following questions: how is aircraft battle damage reported in the USAF 
and where is the system broken?  To begin answering this and other questions posed, this chapter 
presents aircraft battle damage data from OEF and OIF in two clusters.  The first cluster is 
“aircraft-centric.”  In this cluster, the reader will find loss, damage, and casualty data associated 
with particular aircraft.  The purpose is to identify trends, which may be isolated to an aircraft 
family or shared across all fixed-wing aircraft.  The second cluster is “threat-centric.”  In this 
cluster, the same loss, damage, and casualty data presented in cluster one is associated with the 
threat that caused it.  Keep in mind the data presented is a snapshot in time, (2002- 2010).  These 
42 
 
dates correspond to the dataset from SURVIAC (and to a lesser extent other sources), analyzed 
by IDA, and presented in the “Study of Rotorcraft Survivability.”         
4.1  “Aircraft-centric” Battle Damage Cluster 
 
Figure 4-1 shows a breakout of all fixed-wing combat losses and damages reported for the 
period studied.  As of October 2010, three fixed-wing aircraft were lost because of hostile fire in 
OEF and OIF.  All three aircraft losses were TACAIR assets including: (1) A-10, (1) F-15, and 
(1) F/A-18 [19].  Losses account for approximately ten percent of all fixed-wing combat 
incidents, but due to the relatively small numbers involved, very little trend analysis is possible.  
A-10, 3, 6%
AV-8, 1, 2%
C-5, 2, 4%
C-17, 3, 5%
C-23, 9, 16%
C-130, 32, 58%
F-15, 1, 2%
F-16, 3, 5% F-18, 1, 2%
 
Figure 4-1: Aircraft Combat Loss and Damage Incidents, based on 
rotorcraft study data [19] 
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 Therefore, to further refine the analysis this study removed the loss data.  Figure 4-2 contains 
battle damage events with respect to the aircraft involved.  Shown in this figure, in OEF and OIF 
combined, operators have reported fifty-two combat damage incidents (CDIs).  Of these fifty- 
 
A-10, 2, 4%
AV-8, 1, 2%
C-5, 2, 4%
C-17, 3, 6%
C-23, 9, 17%
C-130, 32, 61%
F-16, 3, 6%
 
Figure 4-2: Aircraft Combat Damage Incidents only, based on rotorcraft 
study data [19] 
 
two events, eight involved TACAIR assets, while the remaining forty-six events involved airlift 
assets.  In terms of percentages, airlift CDIs represent eighty-eight percent of all CDIs reported.  
Furthermore, the family of aircraft with the highest concentration of damage events is the C-130 
Hercules (and its variants).  The rotorcraft study recorded thirty-two C-130 CDIs, which 
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represents approximately sixty-one percent of all CDIs and fully seventy percent of airlift 
specific CDIs.  The aircraft with the next highest concentration of CDIs is the C-23 Sherpa, 
which is also tactical airlift aircraft operated by the United States Army.  CDIs reported for the 
C-23 account for seventeen percent of all damage events [19]. 
An important aspect of examining historical combat data is to determine the human impact of 
combat damage or loss occurrences.  Figure 4-3 is a composite of all casualties incurred during a 
combat hostile action event (i.e. aircraft damage or loss.)  The chart segregates casualties by the  
A-10, 1, 10%
C-5, 1, 10%
C-17, 1, 10%
C-23, 4, 40%
F-15, 2, 20%
F-18, 1, 10%
 
Figure 4-3: Casualties Associated with Combat Incidents, based on 
rotorcraft study data [19] 
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aircraft in which the person was flying at the time of the event.  The F-15E is an all-weather 
strike fighter with a crew of two people.  The USAF incurred two fatalities during the loss of a 
single F-15E Strike Eagle.  Additionally, the pilot of a single-seat Navy F/A-18 Hornet was lost.  
Although the aircraft was lost, the pilot of a single-seat A-10 Thunderbolt II escaped from a 
crippled aircraft with injuries.  In total, out of the three combat losses, three aircrew members 
died and one was injured.  As illustrated by the A-10 example, injuries may be associated with 
aircraft losses.  Injuries are also possible during damage only incidents.  As of this writing, 
assessors have reported seven injuries associated with combat damage incidents.  One injury, 
discussed previously, was associated with an aircraft loss, and six injuries have been associated 
with CDIs.  The aircraft with the highest concentration of injuries is the C-23 with four.  The C-
17 Globemaster III and the C-5 Galaxy, both strategic airlift aircraft, each have one injury 
associated with their respective CDIs [19].  Again, the relatively small number of injuries 
prohibits meaningful trend analysis.  However, from a survivability perspective, this is an 
excellent problem to have.  
 
4.2 “Threat-centric” Battle Damage Cluster 
Threat definition is a primary tenant of aircraft survivability.  Thus, in order to protect man 
and material system engineers must first identify the most relevant threat.  In the previous section 
aircraft battle damage data was presented from an aircraft perspective.  This section, beginning 
with Figure 4-4, breaks down the same events illustrated in Figure 4-1 with respect to the threat 
that caused them.  Of the fifty-five total fixed-wing combat damage incidents reported, seventy-
three percent results from small arms or automatic weapons (SA/AWs).  These [SA/AWs] by far 
represent the most common threat to fixed-wing aircraft affecting approximately forty aircraft.  
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The next largest threat categories are blast or explosion and infrared (IR) surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMs).  These two categories each affected three aircraft, which represents approximately five 
percent of the total CDIs, respectively [19]. 
SA/AW, 40, 73%
RPG, 1, 2%
MANPADS, 2, 3%
Rockets, 1, 2%
Blast/Explosion, 3, 
5%
IR SAM, 3, 5% RF SAM, 2, 4%
Unknown, 2, 4%
Lasing, 1, 2%
 
Figure 4-4:  Loss and Damage Incidents by Threat Category, based on 
rotorcraft study data [19] 
 
 
To clarify, blast or explosion is essentially a catchall category for damage because of improvised 
explosive devices, flak from a secondary explosions, etc.  The way blast/explosion differs from 
indirect fire incidents (which are not included in this analysis) is blast damage occurs while in 
the process of accomplishing an intended mission.  This figure is particularly interesting because 
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it includes, among others, a threat to aircraft that most people are unaware even exists—the 
threat of counter-air IEDs.  One of the more poignant findings from the rotorcraft study 
highlights the need for flexibility when dealing with an asymmetric threat.  The study states: 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) caught most unaware during OEF/OIF.  
Although they have been around since explosives have been invented, the enemy’s 
innovative use of triggering devices and concealment has made this an effective 
weapon.  Since we will never be able to predict all the innovative ways an enemy 
will be able to attack us, the best solution will be to have the capability to react 
quickly to new asymmetrical threats.  This can be accomplished by maintaining a 
robust S&T community with the expertise to understand and quickly develop 
counters to threats as they appear.  Just as importantly, we must maintain the 
ability to investigate and understand what is causing our rotorcraft combat losses 
and feed this information back to the acquisition community via the intelligence 
community and in-country assessment teams.  [19]    
 
For consistency between the “threat-centric” data set and “aircraft-centric” data set presented 
earlier in this chapter, Figure 4-5 provides threat data associated with damage only events.  
SA/AWs are, by far, the most prevalent threat and account for seventy-seven percent of all 
damage only incidents.  The remaining twenty-three percent of the total damage incidents were 
inflicted by the following threat categories: (1) RPG, (2) MANPADS, (2) SAMs, (2) unknown 
threats, (3) Blast/Explosion, (1) rocket, and (1) lasing [19].  Note that the data set utilized from 
the “Study on Rotorcraft Survivability” breaks individual CDIs down by aircraft system 
damaged during the reported event.  In the lasing incident, an aircrew member suffered eye 
damage.  In the context of the study, aircrews are aircraft systems.  Therefore, a laser eye injury 
suffered by an aircrew member is a CDI.  Also, note there are two CDIs for which there was not 
enough forensic evidence for the assessor to precisely identify the threat.  Together, these two  
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SA/AW, 40, 77%
RPG, 1, 2%
MANPADS, 2, 4%
Rockets, 1, 2%
Blast/Explosion, 3, 
5% IR SAM, 1, 2%
RF SAM, 1, 2%
Unknown, 2, 4%
Lasing, 1, 2%
 
Figure 4-5:  Damage Only Incidents by Threat Category, based on 
rotorcraft study data [19] 
 
categories are relevant because the fixed-wing damage sample size is relatively small.  Thus, 
inclusion or exclusion of these data points can skew the conclusions that may be drawn.  In the 
interest of full disclosure, the author feels compelled to leave these data points in the data set and 
to let the readers draw their own conclusions about their relevance.  Interestingly, the relatively 
small number of aircraft losses has virtually no effect on the threat environment definition.  An 
observer can see this by comparing Figure 4-4 with Figure 4-5.  Both figures present the same 
information except the latter does not include combat losses.  In either case, SA/AWs remain the 
most prolific threat.   
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Continuing with the format set forth at the beginning of this chapter, Figure 4-6 illustrates 
casualties and their associated threat category.  Similar to the aircraft-centric data (Figure 4-3), 
the threat-centric data (Figure 4-6) does not identify glaring trends with respect to casualties 
alone.   
SA/AW, 4, 40%
MANPADS, 1, 
10%
IR SAM, 3, 30% RF SAM, 1, 10%
Lasing, 1, 10%
 
Figure 4-6: Casualties by Threat Category, based on rotorcraft study data [19] 
 
4.3 Interim Data Summary 
At this point, a minor digression is required.  Unwittingly, with regard to the three incidents 
of blast damage from Figure 4-5, further investigation revealed another dimension to the combat 
damage reporting dynamic—mishaps reported as combat damage incidents.  All three cases of 
blast damage involved F-16CJs in OIF.  On three separate occasions ammunition from each of 
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the F-16CJs’ 20mm cannon exploded next to the aircraft while strafing during close-air support 
missions.  Further investigation determined the cause to be corroded ordinance [19].  Therefore, 
to remain consistent with the definitions outlined in the rotorcraft study from which this data was 
taken and the premise that only combat hostile action data will be presented, these three incidents 
of blast damage are removed.  Figures 4-7 and 4-8 contain the corrected data with the blast 
events removed.  The corrected aircraft-centric combat damage with the mishap blasts removed 
is in Figure 4-7.  Similarly, Figure 4-8 contains the corrected threat-centric data.  Compared to 
the information originally presented (Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-5) it can be seen that the impact of 
removing blast (F-16) damage had little effect on the overall trends.      
A-10, 2, 4% AV-8, 1, 2%
C-5, 2, 4%
C-17, 3, 6%
C-23, 9, 19%
C-130, 32, 65%
 
Figure 4-7: Aircraft Combat Damage Incidents (corrected)  
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SA/AW, 40, 82%
RPG, 1, 2%
MANPADS, 2, 4%
Rockets, 1, 2% IR SAM, 1, 2%
RF SAM, 1, 2%
Unknown, 2, 4%
Lasing, 1, 2%
 
Figure 4-8: Damage Only Incidents, by Threat Category (corrected) 
 
The following is a brief summary of the battle damage data presented to this point.  All three 
aircraft losses and two damages out of the fifty-five total events have been attributed to SAMs.  
SAMs also account for 100% of all fixed-wing aircraft fatalities in OEF and OIF.  Without 
question, SAMs represent the most lethal threat to fixed wing aircraft to date in OEF/OIF.  While 
SAMs are the most lethal threat, SA/AWs are by far the most commonly encountered.  In the 
data from this chapter, a second fact is also readily apparent.  Tactical airlift aircraft are the most 
likely aircraft to sustain combat damage.  Currently, there are only two fixed-wing, tactical airlift 
families of aircraft reported to have sustained combat damage.  They are the C-130 Hercules and 
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the C-23 Sherpa.  Figure 4-9 shows the distribution of threat types associated with CDIs against 
tactical airlift assets.  Analysis shows that of the forty tactical airlift aircraft CDIs reported, 
assessors attribute ninety-two percent to SA/AWs.  Moreover, if the five percent of CDIs 
attributed to an “unknown” threat—which is strongly suspected to be SA/AWs—is added, 
SA/AWs account for ninety-five percent of all tactical airlift CDIs.  
 
SA/AW, 37, 92%
Unknown, 2, 5%
RPG, 1, 3%
 
Figure 4-9:  Tactical Airlift Combat Damage Incidents by Threat Category 
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4.4 Data Verification 
In the previous section, why present the uncorrected data at all?  There are two primary 
reasons for this approach.  One, the F-16CJ blast damage example highlights the struggle to 
gather data, which can be trusted to portray an accurate description of the threat environment.  
Two, it also provides justification to scrutinize the dataset further.  As mentioned previously, the 
survivability community considers the rotorcraft survivability study to be the most 
comprehensive report of aircraft battle damage information reported to SURVIAC.  This fact is 
without question.  However, what if operational units are not reporting all combat damage 
incidents?  Unreported damage could potentially skew the threat picture and mask trends in such 
a relatively small data set.  In turn, leaders at all levels may be unaware of the true risk to man 
and materiel.  In theater, commanders may make operational decisions using false assumptions.  
Meanwhile, material leaders may focus resources on efforts to counter what may not be the 
prevailing threat.  Therefore, it is imperative to validate the data presented to SURVIAC and 
reported in the rotorcraft study.   
Since the single highest CDI rate involves the C-130, the effort to validate the combat data 
begins there.  The C-130 sustainment program office provided a report of aircraft battle damage 
incidents recorded in REMIS under “How Malfunction” code 731.  The REMIS report contains 
over 200 separate entries associated with 96 aircraft.  To be clear, this is not to say that there 
were over 200 CDIs.  Detailed examination determined the majority of the REMIS entries were 
not related to combat damage.  For example, there were entries for benign maintenance issues 
such as static in communications equipment or typical tire wear.  Therefore, the author conducted 
analysis on the REMIS report entries to separate definitive combat damage from typical 
maintenance actions.  The analysis segregated entries, for example, which contain in their 
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narrative verbiage such as “…aircraft has battle damage…” or “…bullet hole…” from entries 
that were more ambiguous.  Once separated, the author crosschecked the aircraft from the 
REMIS report identified to have definitive battle damage with the database from SURVIAC 
associated with the “Study of Rotorcraft Survivability.”  Interestingly, the REMIS database did 
not capture several aircraft identified with battle damage in the rotorcraft study database.  This is 
not surprising considering the intent of REMIS is not to capture battle damage statistics.  
However, the intent of the SURVIAC database used in the rotorcraft study is to capture such 
statistics.  Therefore, it is extremely interesting that ten legitimate reports of C-130 battle damage 
captured in REMIS were unaccounted for in the rotorcraft study data from the same timeframe.  
These ten examples confirm the suspicion that combat damage incidents were going unreported 
to SURVIAC.   
 
4.5 Discrepancy Analysis 
Knowing that CDIs are going unreported, the obvious question that arises is, how and why 
are units failing to report such important data?  In order to begin answering this question, it is 
important to understand the process by which the users populate the databases involved.  
SURVIAC receives reports from JCAT, CLSS, and operational units.  On the other hand, only 
aircraft maintenance/sustainment organizations populate REMIS.  When deployed, the USAF 
typically assigns CLSS to a supporting maintenance group.  Imbedded with day-to-day 
operations, CLSS is available to assess CDIs, make repairs, and report incidents accordingly.  
However, the overall AEF force structure of OEF and OIF did not incorporate CLSS teams.  
Their contribution to the war effort is mainly in response to requests for depot-level repair 
actions or manning assistance—essentially acting as a depot field team.  Compounding this 
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issue, in OEF and OIF JCAT was not part of the original AEF package and did not arrive in force 
until well after hostilities had begun.  JCAT did not have a continuous presence in OIF until 
March 2004, roughly one year after the initial invasion.  Similarly, JCAT did not arrive in OEF 
until October 2008, several years after the beginning of the war [38].  This fact opened the door 
for missed data.  Because CLSS and JCAT (early on) were not in country, the responsibility to 
report CDIs to SURVIAC fell onto maintainers at the unit level. 
In summary, the battle damage dataset is small and has some deficiencies, which needs to be 
reconciled.  Therefore, in order to explain the discrepancy between the incidents of C-130 battle 
damage reported in REMIS and those reported in the “Study of Rotorcraft Survivability,” the 
author examined the manner in which each database is populated.  CLSS and JCAT were not 
integral to the overall AEF package in OEF and OIF from their inception.  Thus, the 
responsibility to report battle damage fell upon maintenance units.  Consequently, as the 
evidence has shown, maintenance organizations recorded some CDIs in REMIS as aircraft battle 
damage but did not report them to SURVIAC.  This explains why IDA did not include these 
events in the rotorcraft study. 
 
4.6 Maintenance Records and Requirements 
The existence of the discrepancies would indicate, at first glance, that maintenance 
organizations are derelict in their duty.  However, further examination of the technical orders 
(TO), which govern maintenance action documentation, highlights some shortcomings that may 
explain, at least to some extent, why some discrepancies exist.  To begin, Air Force Instruction 
(AFI) 21-101, AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT, establishes 
the requirement for the USAF ABDR program [37].  Additionally, AFI 21-101 lays the 
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groundwork for reporting aircraft battle damage.  Organizationally, the aircrew and maintenance 
debrief section falls under the purview of the aircraft maintenance squadron (AMXS).  Refer to 
Figure 4-10 to better understand the construct of a typical Maintenance Group.  The aircrew and 
maintenance debrief section, as the name would imply, is responsible for debriefing the aircrew 
following mission completion.  If, during debriefing, the aircrew reports the possibility of battle 
damage, the aircraft is assigned landing status code five (Code 5) in the aircraft’s AFTO FORM 
781.  If the aircrew does not report battle damage during debrief, it may be found during routine  
 
 
Figure 4-10: Notional Maintenance Group Organization 
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inspections.  Typically, most maintenance discrepancies would spawn an AFTO FORM 781A, 
MAINTENANCE DISCREPANCY AND WORK DOCUMENT.  However, in accordance with 
TO 00-20-1, AEROSPACE EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE INSPECTION 
DOCUMENTATION, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES, Section 5.9.1, battle damage 
discrepancies, “…will not be documented on the 781A.  TO 1-1H-39, GENERAL AIRCRAFT 
BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR (ABDR) technical manual contains specific instructions on 
documenting aerospace vehicle battle damage repairs [21].”  In theory, TO 00-20-1, Section 5.9.1 
would prompt the maintenance organization to seek out TO 1-1H-39 for further instruction.  In 
practice, maintenance personnel follow routines or established procedures designed to meet the 
intent of TO 00-20-1.  Such routines would typically cause personnel assigned to maintenance 
organizations to consult TO 00-20-2, MAINTENANCE DATA DOCUMENTATION, for specific 
guidance on reporting maintenance actions.  However, the only reference to battle damage in TO 
00-20-2 is with respect to the so-called “How Malfunction” code [20].  There is no mention of 
TO 1-1H-39.  Compounding this issue is the fact, until recently; the use of -39 series (ABDR) 
TOs was largely isolated to the CLSS.  Consequently, CLSS personnel are well versed in battle 
damage reporting procedures.  Maintainers outside of CLSS, however, virtually never reference -
39 series TOs.  Thus, when battle damage is encountered maintenance personnel are ill prepared 
for the unique documentation requirements.   
Clearly, assessors are reporting battle damage as confirmed by its existence in the SURVIAC 
database, corroborated in REMIS, and vice versa.  In REMIS, a technician applies a single How 
Malfunction code to all maintenance actions performed at a given time.  For example, if a bullet 
hole repair was performed at the same time as some other routine maintenance, the routine 
maintenance action would also receive How Malfunction code 731 (battle damage).  This is 
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completely in line with TO 00-20-2 and explains the large number of non-combat related entries 
under this code.  Continuing with this hypothetical scenario, assume that the technician consults 
TO 00-20-1 and follows the guidance to refer to TO 1-1H-39.  There the technician will find the 
definition of battle damage and its documentation process.  The definition is as follows: 
“Battle damage is defined as any damage and/or malfunction, typically caused by 
munitions or their effects whether self-inflicted or resulting from enemy or 
friendly fire or by ground mishap, encountered during combat operations [21].”  
 
 
It is important to note this is the only definition of battle damage found while conducting 
research for this thesis.  The intent of this definition is to provide flexibility to commanders by 
authorizing the use of ABDR techniques for a wide range of issues, which may arise during 
combat—not simply to repair damage incurred by hostile fire.  More simply, readers may 
interpret this definition of battle damage as essentially any damage encountered during combat 
operations.  For example, if an aircraft strikes a piece of aerospace ground equipment while 
taxiing for a combat mission, by definition the result of this mishap is battle damage.  From the 
perspective of a survivability analyst, the very broad definition of battle damage becomes 
confusing, especially when little or no detail is available about a reported event.  To be clear, all 
of the CDIs reported in the rotorcraft study easily conform to the USAF definition of battle 
damage.  However, as illustrated previously by the categorization of the F-16CJ blast damages as 
CDIs, an analyst looking to make aircraft more survivable in a hostile environment would have 
to be particularly diligent when making recommendations based on a given data set.  The 
rotorcraft study addresses this factor by further defining combat damage incidents in the 
following manner: Combat Hostile Action—hostile fire involved; Combat Non-Hostile Action—
hostile fire not involved; and Non-Combat—mishap outside of combat zone.  These definitions, 
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in conjunction with the premise this document does not report mishaps, support the argument to 
omit the three blast CDIs.                         
 
4.7 Field-level Repair Options 
The previous section discusses the documentation requirements for maintenance actions.  It 
also discusses areas with shortcomings that explain how and why battle damage may go 
unreported (to SURVIAC).  Nevertheless, there are other reasons that may explain why the 
unreported incidents of battle damage identified in this document have gone unreported.  One 
reason centers on the repair options available to field-level maintenance organizations.   
When maintenance personnel identify aircraft damage or malfunctions, regardless of cause, 
they begin the process of determining what corrective actions are required to return the aircraft to 
operational status.  Figure 4-11 illustrates the notional damage resolution flow that a technician 
may follow.  In this example, a technician examines the issue and references a myriad of repair 
manuals known as technical orders (TOs).  Virtually every weapon system operated by the USAF 
has TOs governing standard repair and maintenance.  Within these TOs,  guidelines can be found 
which tell a technician important details such as how much damage is acceptable without 
performing a repair, maximum repairable damage for a system, standardized repairs, etc.  Once 
the technician assesses the damage or malfunction and identifies the applicable repair, he/she 
executes the corrective action.   
To fully understand this process, consider the following scenario.  During a routine 
inspection, a technician finds a half-inch diameter hole in a wing trailing edge panel.  The 
technician notes the flaw in the aircraft forms and proceeds to coordinate with the necessary 
specialists to further assess the hole.  The specialists take detailed measurements of the hole and  
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Figure 4-11: Notional Damage Resolution Flow 
 
identify its exact location.  The specialists then consult the appropriate repair manual for the 
damaged component.  The author assumes, in this hypothetical scenario, in the repair manual 
holes up to one inch in diameter are repairable by applying a simple sheet metal patch.  After 
installation of the specified patch, a technician updates the aircraft maintenance records and 
returns the aircraft to service.  Revisiting this scenario, assume small arms fire caused the same 
half-inch diameter hole.  Because the repair is within the limitations of the repair manual, a 
technician may follow the exact same process as illustrated in the previous scenario, including 
final documentation.  This is because there is nothing in the standard repair manual to instruct a 
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technician that battle damage has additional reporting requirements.  At no time during this 
process was the technician obligated to search for guidance from the -39 series (ABDR) TOs.  
Therefore, it is possible that in this hypothetical scenario the maintenance organization would not 
report the small arms (battle) damage to SURVIAC.  
An important underlying assumption is in the scenarios presented.  These scenarios imply 
that a weapon system specific ABDR manual exists.  Figure 4-12 shows the damaged vertical  
 
 
Figure 4-12:  C-130J Vertical Stabilizer and Rudder Battle Damage, image 
courtesy of USAF C-130 Program Office [40]  
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stabilizer and rudder of a C-130J located at a deployed location.  The standard structural repair 
manual has repairs that are applicable to this data.  However, to accomplish the standard repair 
the rudder would likely need to be removed, disassembled (to some extent), and potentially 
rebalanced before being reinstalled.  Assuming the tools and materials are on hand at the time of 
the repair, this process would likely take twenty-four hours or more.  Instead of attempting the 
standard repair, the maintenance unit decided to request technical assistance from the responsible 
engineering authority.  Analysis of the damage and the resulting engineering disposition required 
three days.  If an applicable C-130J ABDR TO is available and maintenance leadership so 
inclined, the damage can be temporarily repaired and the aircraft can return to service in a few 
hours.  The C-130J does not have an applicable ABDR TO.  This omission is a critical suitability 
issue that the USAF must address.    
When aircraft damage or malfunctions exceed the limitations stipulated in applicable TOs, 
maintenance organizations must request technical assistance from the responsible engineering 
authority for the subject weapon system (or sub-system).  In the USAF, TO 00-25-107, 
MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE governs the process for most technical assistance requests 
(TARs) [22].  During this process, engineers or equipment specialists evaluate the problem, 
formulate the necessary solution, and then communicate this information to the field-level 
maintenance personnel.  Assume, for example, the hypothetical trailing edge panel hole 
discussed earlier in this section measured one inch in diameter.  An identical process would be 
followed—identify the problem, consult specialists, determine TO limitations, execute repair.  
Except, in this case, a one inch diameter hole exceeds the repair limits of the TO.  Therefore, a 
TAR would be required to determine the necessary repair.  At this time in the scenario, 
maintenance personnel would submit the request as outlined in TO 00-25-107 [22].   
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Following the process flow shown in Figure 4-13, a weapon system manager (SM) point of 
contact (POC) assigns the TAR to an engineer and he/she formulates a solution.  At this time, it 
is important to understand the dynamics of a typical engineering division within an aircraft 
sustainment program office.  The engineers that staff the engineering division of an aircraft 
program office are generally a mixture of DoD civilians, contractors, and active duty military.  
The USAF trains a percentage of military engineers within the engineering division, with the 
possible exception of avionics/electrical engineers, as aircraft battle damage repair engineers  
 
  
Figure 4-13: Technical Assistance Request (TAR) Flowchart 
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(ABDREs).  The ABDRE curriculum includes many of the same classes required by CLSS.  
Thus, ABDREs are intimately familiar with the special requirements for reporting combat 
damage.  The USAF also extends this training to civilian engineers in some cases; however, 
military engineers constitute the bulk of the ABDRE corps.  In this hypothetical scenario, the SM 
POC may or may not assign the TAR addressing the one-inch diameter hole may to an engineer 
with ABDR training.  If in the body of the TAR, the originator identifies the damage as battle 
damage and the engineer analyzing the damage is familiar with ABDR reporting, the repair 
disposition may include guidance on how to properly document the damage in accordance with 
TO 1-1H-39, however, there is no guarantee.  If the originator does not identify the damage as 
battle damage or the engineer providing the repair disposition is not ABDR trained, it is highly 
unlikely that the engineer will provide documentation guidance. 
In both the non-standard repair process and standardized repair process scenarios outlined 
above, maintenance personnel are at no time compelled to seek out TO 1-1H-39.  Consequently, 
when the time comes to document the corrective actions executed to repair battle damage, if the 
technician does not follow the single line on the subject from TO 00-20-1, SURVIAC will not be 
notified.  This crucial historical data will be lost.   
These scenarios are not hypothetical.  For example, C-130, tail number 82-00059 arrived at 
depot with a previously unreported lower wing surface repair.  Depot engineers removed the 
repair and discovered an underlying hole suspected to be battle damage.  No battle damage 
record was located for this action [39].  More definitively is the case of C-130, tail number 02-
08155.  On or around 16 April 2008 an aircraft sustained damage from “multiple low order 
weapon detonations” for an aircraft deployed in support of OIF, OEF, and Combined Joint Task 
Force Horn of Africa.  Nowhere in the repair disposition is there mention of a requirement to 
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report this incident to SURVIAC and, as a result, went unreported despite the fact that, in 
accordance with TO 1-1H-39, the damage clearly falls under the definition of battle damage.  
Another example of damage not being report due to the limitations of the governing policies 
involves C-130, tail number 90-00164.  This aircraft received battle damage that technicians 
repaired in accordance with the C-130 ABDR manual at the direction of the responsible 
engineering authority.  Nowhere in the repair disposition (Figure 4-14) or the C-130 ABDR 
repair manual is there a requirement to report the incident to SURVIAC [42].  Consequently, this 
incident is not in the SURVIAC database at the time of this writing. 
To be clear, the purpose of this example is not to demonize the program office staff or the 
maintenance unit.  There are many instances where the responsible engineering authority 
instructs maintenance personnel to report battle damage to SURVIAC.  The purpose of this 
example is to illustrate that problems exist with the current reporting guidelines.  Figure 4-15 
shows an example of an engineering disposition including instruction to report the battle damage 
to SURVIAC via an AFTO Form 97.  In this case, technicians used the standard repair manual to 
repair battle damage, which the crew believed small arms caused. 
Ultimately, technicians can go about repairing damage, including battle damage, in three 
distinct ways.  They can install a repair with guidance from a standard repair manual for the 
damaged system.  They can request special repair instructions from the responsible engineering 
authority.  Or, if circumstances allow, they can install temporary aircraft battle damage repairs 
(ABDR) with guidance from an applicable ABDR manual.  Of these repair options, the general 
ABDR technical order is the only manual that mentions unique battle damage reporting 
instructions.   
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Figure 4-14: Example Technical Assistance Request (TAR) Identifying Aircraft 
Battle Damage.  Note: blacked-out areas mask specific aircraft data 
and engineer identity.  Highlighted areas show specific ABDR manual 
references.  Image courtesy of USAF C-130 Program Office [40]   
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Figure 4-15: Example Battle Damage Technical Assistance Request (TAR) 
with Reporting Instructions.  Note: blacked-out areas mask 
specific aircraft data and engineer identity.  Highlighted areas show 
specific C-130 manual references.  Image courtesy of USAF C-130 
Program Office [40]   
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4.8 Tactical Airlift Case Study 
Before proceeding, it is important to recall some important details from the information 
presented thus far.  Chapter four begins by presenting battle damage data from OEF and OIF.  
Analysis shows a concentration of battle damage in the tactical airlift family of aircraft.  Analysis 
also shows tactical airlift aircraft are susceptible and passengers are vulnerable to small arms.  
Further investigation revealed the existence of battle damage in maintenance records, for which 
battle damage records do not account.  Further investigation reveals shortcomings in the process 
by which maintenance organizations report battle damage.  In light of these discrepancies, the 
first reaction may be to discount the data presented altogether.  Such a reaction would be 
foolhardy.  For the purpose of continued analysis, assume that the trends identified in the combat 
damage data reported to SURVIAC and presented by IDA in the “Study on Rotorcraft 
Survivability,” remain to be true despite being somewhat incomplete.  REMIS data from the C-
130 program office, which overwhelmingly indicates SA/AW as the primary threat, supports this 
assumption.  Therefore, in the following section, the author examines tactical airlift aircraft to 
identify survivability concerns.   
One of the fundamental questions posed in Section 2 was how system program offices 
incorporate current battle damage statistics into the acquisitions process.  To explore this 
question it is first important to understand how requirements are developed.  One way program 
offices develop requirements based on maintenance records and identified maintenance trends.  
For example, if the system program office (SPO) identifies the mean time between failures for a 
particular component is too short and its impact to operational capability is too high, they may 
redesign or otherwise improve the component.  This requires the SPO to come up with viable 
solutions, cost estimates, and determine the most effective course of action.  Another way 
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requirements are developed is in response to an urgent needs statement from users involved in 
combat.  Of course, SPOs give such requirements high priority.   
The C-23 Sherpa (Figure 4-16) is the military version of the Shorts 330/360 regional airliner.  
It operates in the intra-theater (tactical) airlift role.  Originally operated by the military’s 
transportation command, the USAF primarily flew the C-23 throughout Europe.  Its users are 
capable of outfitting the C-23 for various missions.  It is capable of carrying up to 30 passengers 
when operators install airline-style seats or it can be loaded with pallets and containers.   
 
 
Figure 4-16: C-23 Sherpa, courtesy of Alaska National Guard [23] 
 
70 
 
Additionally, operators can configure the aircraft for medical evacuation and transportation 
duties.  The Sherpa is capable of operating from short, austere runways and capable of 
performing airdrops.  The DoD procured C-23s as Shorts airliners.  Contractors then modify the 
airplanes with additional equipment not found on the civilian aircraft.  In March of 2005, the 
U.S. Army awarded M7 Aerospace a contract for C-23 life cycle support.  Under this contract, 
M7 Aerospace provides all services required to keep C-23s operational [24].   
As seen from the data presented, fixed-wing tactical airlift aircraft are highly susceptible to 
SA/AWs.  In the case of the C-23 Sherpa, little protection for passengers is offered against such 
threats as evident by the rate of injuries associated with this aircraft.  In response to this fact, the 
U.S. Army produced an urgent needs statement requesting additional protection from the effects 
of SA/AW threats.  In response, M7 Aerospace developed a solution and the U.S. Army 
subsequently provided authorization to incorporate ballistic protection on C-23s [24].  In this 
regard, the U.S. Army C-23 Sherpa program; therefore, is an example of how the DoD 
acquisitions community, in concert with their contract support organizations, responds to urgent 
requests.   
Designed and built in the 1950’s the venerable C-130 Hercules (Figure 4-17) performs the 
intra-theater (tactical) airlift mission.  The aircraft is capable of operations from unimproved 
runways and is capable of air dropping troops and equipment.  The DoD has developed 
specialized versions of the aircraft over more than four decades of service.  Variants of the C-130 
are capable of performing a wide range of missions including: Antarctic resupply, aeromedical 
evacuation, weather reconnaissance, aerial firefighting, air-to-air refueling, close air support and 
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.  In its most basic form, the C-130 has a large 
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fuselage area that can accommodate a plethora of cargo from vehicles and troops to helicopters.  
The USAF has made continuous improvements over the C-130s lifespan.  More powerful  
 
Figure 4-17: C-130 Hercules, image courtesy of USAF [5] 
 
engines, increased fuel capacity, and other improvements have increased its flying performance 
and capabilities.   
In February 1999, the C-130J entered service with the USAF [26].  The “J model,” as it is 
typically referred to, only shares approximately thirty percent of its features with so-called 
“legacy” C-130 models.  Most of the commonality between the J model and its predecessors is in 
the basic airframe.  That is not to say that the airframe structure is a carryover—quite the 
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contrary.  For example, Lockheed replaced several metallic structures such as trailing edge 
panels and control surfaces with composites.  Externally the J model may look like its legacy 
brethren, but the similarities essentially end there.  Differences include digital avionics, two-
person cockpit (down from four), Rolls-Royce engines, and, most obvious to the casual observer, 
six-blade propellers.   
In May 1995, DOT&E designated the C-130J for LFT&E oversight.  Specific areas of 
interest included: wing dry bays, propellers, wing fuel tanks, engines, and engine nacelles.  
Subsequent tests on these areas identified significant vulnerabilities to ballistic threats.  One may 
split the nature of these vulnerabilities into two categories: hydrodynamic ram effects and fire 
effects (see Sections 4.10.2.1 and 4.10.2.2 for more detail on these subjects).  With regard to dry 
bay fires, the DOT&E FY1999 annual report for the C-130J stated: 
Ballistic testing of the C-130J wing dry bays has shown them to be extremely 
vulnerable to realistic threats, however at the same time, although not planned for 
production design, gas generators (SPGG) have proven to be highly effective in 
extinguishing fuel fires resulting from ballistic impact [27]. 
And, 
Preliminary results of LFT&E indicate that identified C-130J wing dry bays are 
vulnerable to expected threats and that an SPGG system could be designed to 
effectively extinguish ballistically induced dry bay fuel fires.  Careful 
consideration should be given to installing SPGGs for dry bay protection to 
reduce identified vulnerabilities [27]”  
The following year, the FY2000 annual report states: 
I continue to be concerned about the potential vulnerability of this aircraft to fire 
and explosion from impacts into the wing dry bays and several other large 
presented areas of the aircraft.  We have had extensive discussions with the Air 
Force and the Under Secretary of Defense (A, T&L) on this issue and we have 
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reached agreement that this is indeed a vulnerability which the Air Force must fix 
[28].  
This level of involvement marked a key opportunity to take the necessary steps to resolve such a 
critical vulnerability.  Unfortunately, the FY2009 annual report indicates that dry bay 
suppression systems incapable of suppressing fires induced by representative threats tested.  The 
same report also notes that the C-130J remains vulnerable to the effects of hydrodynamic ram.  
This is some ten years after DOT&E identified these (among other) vulnerabilities.  The FY2009 
report goes on to assess that the C-130J is not effective for worldwide operations in a non-
permissive threat environment despite seeing deployments to the Air Force Central Command 
(AFCENT) area of responsibility (AOR).  The program has had successes with regard to 
survivability improvements.  For example, DOT&E grades the engine nacelle fire extinguishing 
system as highly effective.  The propellers, questioned early in the program, were determined to 
have low vulnerability to the tested threats and the aircraft’s overall vulnerability to MANPADS 
is low as well.  These findings highlight two major damage mechanisms: hydrodynamic ram and 
fire/explosions.  The following sections briefly introduce these topics.      
Hydrodynamic ram is a phenomenon that occurs when a penetrator impacts a fluid filled 
chamber.  The impact of the penetrator and its propagation cause the internal pressure of the fluid 
to increase, in many cases, dramatically.  Two main factors cause this pressure increase.  First, 
the penetrator transfers some  
of its kinetic energy to the fluid forming a shockwave.  Figure 4-18, phase one illustrates this 
event.  The shockwave then travels relatively quickly through the fluid.  The second factor 
increasing the fluid’s internal pressure is cavitation.  Figure 4-18 shows the cavitation beginning 
in phase 2.  The penetrator causes cavitation when fluid displaces along its path.  This  
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Phase 1—Strong 
Shock Forms
Phase 2—Weak 
Cavitation Wave 
Forms; Strong Shock 
Propagates
Phase 3—Strong 
Shock Impacts Vessel 
Wall; Cavitation 
Wave Propagates  
Figure 4-18: Phases of Hydrodynamic Ram 
 
displacement allows a cavity to form.  Emanating from this cavity is yet another wave front—
albeit slower and with a smaller pressure gradient.  These pressure waves interact with the 
chamber walls and other structures along their pathways until they dissipate due to viscous forces 
or the pressure is relieved otherwise.  In many cases, the pressure is relieved through the failure 
of one or more chamber walls.  If those chamber walls happen to be the primary structural 
members of an aircraft, the results can be catastrophic.  Options for the mitigation of 
hydrodynamic ram effects in aircraft structures (primarily those containing fuel) include 
controlling the volume of fuel held in a particular tank, lining the fuel tank with energy absorbing 
materials, and designing tanks such that sharp corners are minimized [6].  The C-130, including 
the J model, employs rubber fuel bladders in some of its fuel tanks.  This is an example utilizing 
an energy absorbing material to mitigate the effects of hydrodynamic ram.        
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Explosions produce effects similar to those produced by hydrodynamic ram.  Both involve 
significant pressure gradients without the means to adequately dissipate them.  Explosions have  
three significant elements in common with fires.  To exist, both require fuel, oxidizer, and a 
source of ignition.  If any one of these three elements is missing, a fire or explosion cannot occur.  
The sequence of events following ignition can vary.  One potential sequence of events involving 
fire is shown in Figure 4-19.  In combat, a projectile entering an aircraft’s fuel tank typically 
initiates ullage fires.  The fire then burns until it consumes all oxygen or it is extinguished  
 
Phase 1—Ullage is 
Ignited by Penetrator
Phase 2—Flame 
Front Propagate and 
Internal Pressure 
Increases
Phase 3—Internal 
Pressure and Heat 
Causes Vessel 
Deformation (Failure)  
Figure 4-19: Phases of Fire Growth and Effects 
 
otherwise.  In some cases, it is possible for the ullage to explode.  Should a fire occur, it is 
imperative that its duration is kept to a minimum.  Otherwise, a fire or explosion will surely 
affect unprotected systems in the area.  Fire, even if isolated to small areas, can destroy electrical 
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wiring, actuators, hydraulic system components, flight controls, aircraft structure, etc.—all 
having potentially catastrophic consequences.  Because the hazard of fire damage is not limited 
to military applications, the aerospace industry has developed a wide range of fire risk mitigation  
technologies.  These technologies are based on the following principles: removal of the energy 
necessary to support combustion; interference with the combustion mixing process; dilution of 
the oxygen concentration; removal of fuel vapors; and breakdown of the long combustion chain 
reaction.  Examples of technologies used to prevent or extinguish fires are: explosion suppressant 
foam (ESF), ballistic foam, fibrous flame suppressors, EXPLOSAFETM (expanded aluminum 
flame arrestor), fuel tank inerting, and numerous extinguishing agents [6].  The C-130, including 
USAF J models, employs (ESF) and other technologies to prevent fires.  ESF prevents the fuel 
vapors above liquid fuel (ullage) in fuel from igniting by arresting the flame front and isolating 
ignition sources.  Figure 4-20 shows a technician installing ESF in a C-130 wing tank.  
Essentially, technicians fill every cubic inch of fuel volume with ESF.  The technician in the inset 
photo of Figure 4-20 demonstrates the confined space requirements for ESF installation (note 
respirator and other personal protection equipment.   
Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) operated C-130Js were not 
initially equipped with ESF.  Tragically, insurgents in Iraq happened upon this vulnerability on 
30 January 2005.  On that day ten UK personnel lost their life when, after coming under attack 
by ground-to-air fire, the right hand fuel tank exploded.  The explosion caused the outer wing to 
separate from the aircraft at which point the aircraft became uncontrollable [29].  By late 2008,  
the RAF had installed ESF on approximately three-quarters of their C-130 fleet.  The RAAF, 
aware of the vulnerability, had already begun a project to retrofit ESF in its J models on 10 
December 2004 [30].  In the U.S., the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force and DOT&E agreed to  
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Figure 4-20: C-130 ESF (image courtesy of USAF) [5] 
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execute a C-130J LFT&E program in 1998.  This program identified the potential vulnerability 
represented by ballistic threats and as a result ordered LFT&E to conduct tests to evaluate the 
risks.  Early analysis from 1999 confirmed vulnerability to representative threats [27]. 
Why was this vulnerability not identified earlier in the acquisition process?  Lockheed-
Martin initiated the C-130J program as a contractor funded development program in 1996.  In 
1999, the United Kingdom became the first customer for the J model and several other countries 
followed suit including Australia, Denmark, Italy, and Norway.  The USAF also entered into the 
acquisition program and, as the largest operator, provided oversight of aircraft development.  At 
the time, procurement was to proceed under a commercial acquisition strategy.  According to the 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG), when using a commercial acquisition strategy it is 
incumbent upon the program manager to: 
 
 …pay particular attention to the intended product use environment and 
understand the extent to which this environment differs from (or is similar to) the 
commercial use environment.  Subtle differences in product use can significantly 
impact system effectiveness, safety, reliability, and durability [14]. 
 
Among other reasons, the USAF chose a commercial acquisition approach because the prime 
contractor, Lockheed-Martin, already expended significant development costs.  As the program 
progressed and the government evaluated aircraft, it became clear that significant issues existed 
which made the C-130J unsuitable for its intended military mission.  Consequently, the J model 
program had to incorporate upgrades, which the program phased in through the fall of 2000, to 
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address more than 50 deficiencies.  By incorporating these upgrades, the program evolved from a 
COTS program to a “modified COTS” program.  Again, according to the DAG, “…a ‘modified 
COTS product’… by definition, is not a COTS product…  [14].”  Therefore, efficiencies that may 
be gained by using a commercial acquisition strategy are if the product is modified to meet 
military operational safety, suitability, and effectiveness requirement.  For example, the USAF 
developed the C-130E/H with full funding from its inception.  Included in the development 
contract was complete ownership of engineering analysis, technical specifications, and 
engineering drawings for the resulting aircraft.  Consequently, the DoD can make modifications 
during the life cycle of the aircraft to account for diminishing sources of supplies, evolving 
environmental legislation, modifications, etc. without the blessing of the original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM).  The USAF did not procure a similar technical data package for the C-
130J.  As a result, to address the issues listed previously the USAF must either consult the OEM 
or embark on a costly reverse engineering process. 
The USAF implemented a similar acquisition strategy for the purchase of the Joint Cargo 
Aircraft (JCA) the C-27J Spartan.  The C-27J Spartan (Figure 4-21) was selected to fill the Joint 
Cargo Aircraft (JCA) requirement originally developed by the U.S. Army.  The intent of this 
requirement was to have an aircraft capable of interoperating between heavy lift helicopters, such 
as the CH-47 Chinook, and larger intra-theater airlift aircraft such as the C-130 Hercules.  Alenia 
designed the C-27J to operate from short, unimproved runways.  It can carry three standard 
pallets, six airdrop bundles, up to 40 passengers, 26 paratroops, or 18 NATO standard litters.  
The Army transferred primary oversight of the program to the USAF in 2009.  Full-rate 
production is scheduled for FY2011.  Ballistic testing results presented in the FY2009 DOT&E 
annual report indicate the C-27J is vulnerable to dry bay fires in the wing leading and trailing  
80 
 
 
Figure 4-21: C-27J Spartan (JCA) [5] 
edges.  DOT&E expects the final LFT&E evaluation of the C-27J in FY2011.  It will determine 
if the actions taken by the military adequately address the dry bay fire vulnerability [13].  Other 
survivability features of the C-27J include critical system redundancy (electrical, hydraulic, 
controls, etc.); damage tolerant structural design (including a three-spar wing structure), aircraft 
survivability equipment (ASE); and on-board inert gas generating system (OBIGGS) [31].  In 
general, aircraft use OBIGGS to mitigate the risk of ullage fires.  As fuel is consumed, the empty 
space in the fuel tanks (ullage) is filled with an inert gas—typically nitrogen.  This minimizes the 
development of highly volatile fuel vapors.  OBIGGS is widely used throughout the civil and 
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military aviation industry and is highly effective, if properly designed, at preventing ullage fires.  
Compared to ESF used in the C-130J, OBIGGS does not displace usable fuel capacity and the 
maintenance penalty is much lower.  On the other hand, OBIGGS is expensive if not 
incorporated as part of the early aircraft design.  For example, C-27J total life-cycle costs likely 
support the manufacturer’s decision to install OBIGGS as part of its original configuration.  
Conversely, life-cycle costs do not support replacing ESF with OBIGGS on C-130J aircraft [33].  
This is primarily because Lockheed-Martin did not install OBIGGS as original equipment on C-
130s. 
This chapter presents raw battle damage information from OEF and OIF.  The data shows a 
definite concentration of aircraft battle damage associated with the tactical airlift mission.  
Furthermore, data shows the most persistent threat is certainly small arms.  All of the tactical 
airlift aircraft operating in Iraq and Afghanistan share the same general performance and 
survivability features.  They also share the same general vulnerability to fire damage and 
hydrodynamic ram effects.  The fact they share similar battle damage statistics in OEF and OIF; 
therefore, is expected.  The C-130 presence in the respective theaters of operation is considerably 
greater than the smaller C-23.  This is the most likely explanation for the higher damage incident 
rate on the C-130.  Due to the concentration of battle damage caused by ballistic threats, the 
author presented their associated damage mechanisms.  This chapter also highlights fundamental 
flaws in the battle damage reporting process.  The importance of correcting these flaws and 
ensuring the process is robust cannot be overstated.  In the C-130, C-23, and C-27J cases, the 
Director of Operational Test & Evaluation uses actual combat damage reports produced by 
SURVIAC to determine live-fire test criteria.  If the data presented to SURVIAC is incomplete, 
their analysts may draw conclusions, which are inconsistent with reality.   
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V. Conclusions/Recommendations 
 
Aircraft safety has come a long way from the wood and fabric machines of World War I to 
the metal and composite workhorses of today.  In parallel, aircraft combat survivability has 
improved.  The fact that fixed-wing aircraft remain susceptible and vulnerable to existing threats 
is without question.  These results provide the beginnings of a roadmap intended to the guide 
efforts, produce viable solutions, and the steer the concentration of resources.  Take these results 
in context.  It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the next war that is fought will likely 
be very different from the current wars.  Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are the most lethal threat 
encountered in the modern battlespace.  This fact remains largely unchanged since the war in 
Southeast Asia (SEA).  In today’s fight, fixed-wing aircraft are most widely exposed to small 
arms and automatic weapons (SA/AWs).  As a subset of fixed-wing aircraft involved in combat 
in OEF and OIF, tactical airlift assets are the most susceptible to threats.     
Fixed-wing aircraft remain vulnerable to the threat posed by surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).  
All losses, to date, incurred in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION 
IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) are because of engagements involving SAMs.  The rapid 
establishment of air superiority in both of these operations is the reason for relatively low aircraft 
losses.  In OEF, U.S. forces won air superiority quickly because years of civil war and the lack of 
a strong centralized government in Afghanistan prevented the establishment of an effective 
integrated air defense system (IADS) or defensive air arm.  In Iraq, years of sanctions following 
OPERATION DESERT STORM prevented the reconstitution of their IADS.  The Iraqi military 
either hid its operational fighters in hopes of a rapid coalition withdrawal or ferried them to 
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neighboring countries for safekeeping.  Consequently, the U.S. military once again established 
air superiority during the early days of OIF.  Despite a relatively small number of SAM 
engagements, the military cannot ignore the losses.  Hence, the defense industry should continue, 
its efforts to reduce susceptibility and vulnerability to this threat. 
Eighty percent of all fixed-wing aircraft engagements involve SA/AWs.  SA/AWs represent 
the most prevalent threat encountered in OEF and OIF, by far.  In general, adversaries tend to 
guide SA/AWs visually or acoustically.  Thus, to decrease susceptibility to this threat, 
technologies that enable nighttime operations and decrease an aircraft’s acoustic signature are 
crucial.  Other concepts of operations could involve high-altitude ingress to the target-landing 
zone, followed by a steep, low power (and therefore quiet) tactical approach.  Tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are best left to the experts.  However, some combination of 
these efforts could significantly reduce the combat damage incident rate.  Fortunately, U.S. fixed-
wing assets have proven, thus far, to be survivable against this threat.  To continue this trend, the 
defense industry should direct efforts toward ensuring the tolerance level of aircraft systems to 
ballistic threats provide for sufficient margin of safety to account for potential threat evolution.  
For example, if the most common threat to an aircraft is, hypothetically, a 12.7 mm ballistic 
projectile and the systems are designed to be survivable at this level—is there adequate safety 
margin should the prevalent threat become a 20mm projectile?  Of course, designers must 
balance the level of protection provided, current threats, and practical limitations.  However, on 
future systems, designers could leverage technologies that enable tailoring the level of protection 
and, in some cases, retrofit them onto current systems.  A simple example of this could be the 
installation of Kevlar TM under the cargo floor of a transport aircraft.  Retrofitting these additional 
protection measures in practice is typically easier said than done.  This is why it is critically 
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important that the acquisitions community incorporate requirements for such capabilities early in 
the system design process.  There is a saying in survivability, “If the new system is only as 
survivable as the system it is replacing, then it is no better than the old system [41].” 
Ballistic projectiles like those fired from SA/AWs can cause the hydrodynamic ram 
phenomenon.  The effects of hydrodynamic ram can be devastating to aircraft structures.  At this 
time, the physics of hydrodynamic ram are prohibitively difficult to model; therefore, costly tests 
are usually involved to determine vulnerability.  For this reason, significant effort should be 
concentrated on the characterization of this phenomenon; development of predictive models; and 
the development of materials and techniques that mitigate its effects.  One possible mitigation 
technique is the application of an energy absorbing material, such as elastomeric polyurethane.  
This material can be sprayed or rolled onto the walls of a vessel and when impacted by a 
projectile, absorb the ensuing shock wave.  Pairing this technology with other similar 
technologies like flexible bladders could potentially amplify their efficacy. 
The potential for fire and/or explosions because of ballistic projectile impacts like those from 
SA/AWs present a significant risk.  Aside from the obvious dangers associated with an explosion 
such as catastrophic structural failures, resultant fires have the potential to cause cascading series 
of subsequent failures.  Some of these effects are rapid consumption of fluids like hydraulic 
fluid, engine oil, and fuel, which causes failure in the affected systems.  Other consequences of 
lingering fires can include structural failures, mechanical system failures, and additional 
explosions.  Therefore, research and development in fire detection, prevention, and extinguishing 
continue to be invaluable.  Incorporation of these technologies early in the system design phase 
of a program, as always, is absolutely essential to produce the desired outcome.   
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Aside from the damage mechanisms listed, small arms have another critical factor—the work 
force required to repair damage.  The military deploys with far less “excess” capacity than in 
previous conflicts.  It is imperative; therefore, that an aircraft not only be survivable but also 
rapidly repairable.  Institutionally, aircraft battle damage repair (ABDR) technology has 
remained relatively stagnant.  However, ABDR continues to be a relevant skill to have available 
during conflict.  In OEF and OIF, maintenance organizations and their leadership are reluctant to 
utilize these skills.  This is mainly due to the misconception about the temporary nature of repairs 
installed in accordance with ABDR manuals.  Granted, repairs installed per a weapon system 
ABDR manual have recurring inspection requirements and are, by definition, temporary.  
However, the USAF typically cycles aircraft, deployed to the OEF or OIF area of responsibility 
(AOR), back to their respective home stations on a regular basis.  Today, deployed maintenance 
units enjoy ready communication with the engineering authority responsible for a weapon 
system.  This allows for consultation with subject matter experts, which more often than not 
results in the removal of re-inspection requirements for temporary repairs.  Upon return to home 
station, technicians may remove and replace temporary repairs with permanent repairs.  Together, 
these factors—connectivity and aircraft rotation—actually makes the use of ABDR techniques 
more attractive because they typically require less time to install.  Another reason leaders seem to 
not embrace ABDR is the fact that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have not been traditional 
wars of attrition.  If an aircraft sustains significant damage and is going to require an inordinate 
effort to repair, then deployed units will request, and usually receive, a replacement aircraft.  This 
may not always be the case.  The USAF, in recent years, is relying heavily on its technological 
advantage to compensate for imbalances in sheer numbers.  There is a tipping point at which one 
of the principles of war—mass—cannot not be achieved.  Mass enables numerically smaller 
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forces to achieve decisive results.  Unless planners know the tipping point with the utmost 
certainty, retaining the ability to regenerate battle-damaged aircraft is a valuable insurance policy 
to ensure that the USAF maintains mass.  To remain relevant and effective, ABDR techniques 
and materials must evolve along with the aircraft on which the USAF employs them.  This is 
why one of the stated objectives of live fire test and evaluation (LFT&E) is to, “Assess 
recoverability from battle damage and battle damage repair capabilities and issues [14].” 
Fixed-wing aircraft engaged in the tactical airlift mission expose themselves to hostile threats 
in OEF and OIF more than any other fixed-wing category.  Ninety-five percent of all tactical 
airlift engagements involve an encounter with SA/AWs.  Therefore, material leaders should aim 
considerable resources at assessing vulnerability, reducing vulnerability, and identifying 
technologies that reduce susceptibility of tactical airlift aircraft to SA/AW threats.         
The highest concentration of injuries associated with a fixed-wing aircraft, as a result of a 
combat damage incident (CDI), occurred in the C-23 Sherpa.  The C-23 is a relatively slow and 
low flying aircraft.  Its tactical airlift mission makes it susceptible to threats close to the ground 
in hostile environments.  Combat data indicates that, while the aircraft itself is survivable in this 
environment, the occupants are at risk.  In response to this reality, the U.S. Army initiated a 
program to add ballistic protection to existing C-23s.  M7 Aerospace completed the project, but 
information about its effectiveness in an operational environment was unavailable at the time of 
this writing.  Considering the concentration of damage incidents within the tactical airlift 
category, the U.S. Army should consider a robust aircraft battle damage repair (ABDR) 
capability—if not already in place.  The capability should include guidance for accurately 
assessing battle damage, unrepaired damage limitations, and expeditionary repair techniques.  
The USAF originally purchased the C-23 as a commercial derivative not intended to fly in non-
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permissive environments.  Hence, the evolution of the C-23 mission warrants, at a minimum, a 
cursory re-investigation of survivability.  Per the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, with regard to 
commercial derivatives, it is incumbent upon the weapon system program manager to ensure that 
the system co-evolves with essential changes to doctrine.  Survivability with respect to SA/AWs 
and their effects are, obviously, the most pressing concern.  Consequently, DOT&E should 
examine topics such as critical system redundancy; fire/explosion prevention and detection; fire 
suppression/extinguishing; and hydrodynamic ram effects.   
The C-130 family of tactical airlift aircraft has sustained more battle damage in OEF and OIF 
than all other fixed-wing aircraft combined.  As with the C-23, the tactical airlift mission requires 
the C-130 to fly close to the ground and relatively slow speeds.  In Afghanistan, the terrain also 
plays a significant role.  High peaks may flank landing zones near forward operating bases that 
the USAF services with C-130s.  The combination of the slow and low flight requirement for 
landing and abundant hostile firing positions equates to a situation, which is akin to, proverbially 
shooting fish in a barrel.  Impressively, there are no injuries associated with the reported 
incidents of combat damage.  This is a testament to the efforts to provide ballistic protection for 
both the crew and cargo area.  Nonetheless, it is crucial to constantly reevaluate the level of 
protection that systems provide against the potential evolution of the threat environment.   
From an aircraft systems perspective, combat data indicates a relatively high survivability to 
the threats faced by the C-130.  However, LFT&E of the C-130J, conducted during FY2008 
indicated vulnerability to hydrodynamic ram and limited effectiveness of the dry bay fire 
suppression system.  These vulnerabilities are not limited to J model versions.  The structural 
characteristics that lend J models to being vulnerable to hydrodynamic ram and dry bay fires are 
virtually identical on legacy C-130s.  Compounding the issue is the fact that SA/AWs can initiate 
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hydrodynamic ram and dry bay fires.  It is important; therefore, to continue efforts to reduce 
these risks.   
The sheer volume of C-130 CDIs when compared to other MDSs highlights the need to have 
a robust ABDR program in place.  In accordance with AFI 21-101, AIRCRAFT AND 
EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT, Section 14.1, Air Force Materiel Command 
(AFMC) shall assume management responsibility for USAF ABDR Programs.  Included in the 
AFI 21-101 directed responsibilities is the task to develop the capability to repair battle and crash 
damaged aircraft and to support the publication of weapon system specific ABDR TOs.  With 
respect to legacy C-130s, TO 1C-130A-39 meets the ABDR TO requirement.  This document 
covers USAF C-130E and C-130H aircraft.  However, the legacy ABDR TO does not cover the 
C-130J.  In this regard, AFMC is derelict in its responsibility.  Not having a J model specific 
ABDR TO has had significant repercussions for deployed operations.  For example, without an 
ABDR TO, technicians must repair battle damage in accordance with standard repair manuals or 
specific guidance from the responsible engineering authority via a technical assistance request.  
Both options typically have time penalties associated with them.  Standard repairs typically 
involve time-consuming steps, such as corrosion prevention measures, which a technician may 
not omit without engineering authorization.  Requesting repair procedures through the technical 
assistance process could potentially have a time penalty measured in days—not including the 
time required to actually install the repair.  Alternatively, with an ABDR TO, technicians could 
quickly triage damage and make a realistic assessment of the level of effort needed to return the 
aircraft to at least some measure of mission capability.  This capability is why ABDR is relevant, 
a force multiplier, and must be expanded to include the C-130J. 
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The threats encountered by C-130s in OEF and OIF tend to be, primarily, ballistic projectiles.  
This category of threat usually involves visually or acoustically acquiring and tracking of the 
target (C-130) followed by multiple shot engagements.  To reduce susceptibility in this scenario 
it is necessary to employ technologies that decrease an aircraft’s visual and acoustic signatures.  
Where applicable, operators should employ technologies such as the Joint Precision Air Drop 
System (JPADS).  This technology increases the C-130’s ability to standoff from a given threat 
environment and could therefore minimize threat exposure.  Unfortunately, operators cannot 
always avoid threats.  In these cases, it is imperative that aircraft systems be survivable to the 
level of threat encountered.  DOT&E identified hydrodynamic ram and dry bay fire suppression 
as critical vulnerabilities for the C-130.  Therefore, researches should focus resources to identify 
technologies to mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities.   
One procedure for mitigating the effects of hydrodynamic ram is to minimize fuel quantity 
held in each tank when the possibility of being exposed to a ballistic threat is high.  Generally, 
this procedure increases the possibility of fire or explosion if hit.  However, USAF C-130s are 
equipped with explosive suppressant foam (ESF) proven to be effective at preventing such 
events.  Legacy C-130s also have the option of utilizing external fuel tanks.  Operators can 
completely fill external fuel tanks to their capacity.  If hit, the hydrodynamic ram effects are 
limited to the external fuel tank structure and, thus, are less likely to cause catastrophic failure of 
the wing.  Strategically placed check valves prevent the total loss of fuel.  Therefore, the 
combination of creative fuel load management with ESF may make the C-130 more survivable in 
a ballistic threat environment.  With regard to the vulnerability associated with dry bay fires, 
engineers have made significant progress over the last decade of J model development.  Planners 
should apply the lessons learned, where able, to the legacy fleet.  The C-130 has proven itself a 
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survivable platform in the current environment.  However, significant shortcomings remain.  
Enemy tactics and weapons are constantly evolving.  Therefore, it is vital that the USAF employ 
an agile scientific, engineering, and acquisitions community capable of predicting and if need be 
reacting to changing threats.   
The C-27J is included in this analysis because it is the newest member of the tactical airlift 
family of aircraft.  The C-27J will be performing similar missions to both the C-23 Sherpa and 
C-130 Hercules.  When deployed, its mission profile will expose the C-27J to the same types of 
threats as other aircraft performing the tactical airlift mission.  Therefore, its inclusion herein is 
both validated and relevant.  Like the legacy C-130, Alenia designed the C-27J for the tactical 
airlift role.  Like its larger brethren, the C-27J will have to mitigate the risks associated with 
flying low and slow in a hostile environment.  Realizing this fact, DOT&E designated the C-27J 
for LFT&E oversight as a covered system.  In the FY2009 DOT&E report, ballistic testing 
demonstrated that the C-27J wing was vulnerable to dry bay fire in the leading and trailing 
edges.  The subsequent report for FY2010, states, “The survivability of the JCA [C-27J] against 
the threats tested and analyzed is comparable to other military cargo aircraft [34].”  From this 
statement, one can infer that some of the limitations outlined elsewhere in this document are 
applicable.  Thus, prior to entering combat it is imperative that the USAF take steps to mitigate 
the risks associated with the SA/AWs.  This includes developing tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) to avoid ballistic threats; protecting all crew and occupants from ballistic 
threats; taking steps to minimize ballistic projectile effects such as hydrodynamic ram and fire; 
and producing a robust ABDR manual and training program.  
 
91 
 
5.1 General Technical Order Change Recommendations to Improve the Battle Damage 
Reporting Process  
Perhaps the most important outcome of this analysis is the identification of deficiencies 
in the process for reporting battle damage to SURVIAC.  It is absolutely critical to the 
discipline of aircraft survivability to have timely, accurate, and actionable information about 
the threats being encountered in combat as well as the damage those threats are inflicting.  
Without the utmost confidence in the battle damage captured, the assumptions made to 
protect man and materiel, may drive analyst to faulty conclusions.  Therefore, in order to 
correct the deficiencies identified in this document, which may have influenced units to not 
report battle damage to SURVIAC, the author recommends a series of changes to 
maintenance documentation procedures.  This is a near-term solution.  The intent of these 
changes is to direct entities that may encounter battle damage, or corrective actions thereto, 
to the SURVIAC reporting procedure found in TO 1-1H-39.  The desired effect, therefore, is 
to ensure SURVIAC captures all battle damage incidents, regardless of what corrective action 
technicians take to repair them.  These recommendations increase awareness of the unique 
reporting requirements of battle damage at unit level.  Ideally, these unique requirements 
would be covered and emphasized during initial and recurring documentation training 
conducted by all involved parties.  Changes to existing technical orders do not improve the 
speed or efficiency of the reporting process.  To address these issues, the mid-term solution 
the author recommends involves the development of an “electronic AFTO Form 97.”  
Maintenance organizations with connectivity will be able to quickly upload pertinent 
information, which will instantly available to analyst and other users.  This will dramatically 
reduce the lag, which the current paper AFTO Form 97 process experiences.  Both the near-
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term and mid-term changes will achieve the goal of improving the battle damage reporting 
process, but the long-term goal is making battle damage reporting no different from any other 
maintenance documentation.  For this to occur, the author recommends incorporating battle 
damage reporting into existing maintenance data documentation resources such as REMIS.      
The near-term recommendations consist mainly of verbiage additions and changes to 
technical orders already in existence.  Maintenance documentation in the USAF is a robust 
institution.  Rather than attempt a massive change, adapting ABDR documentation 
requirements to it is a more productive approach.   
TO 1-1H-39 contains the authoritative definition of battle damage.  It alone contains the 
information necessary to steer battle damage information to SURVIAC.  However, the 
definition of battle damage, contained therein, is extremely wordy and confusing.  The 
current definition of battle damage is as follows: “Battle damage is defined as any damage 
and/or malfunction, typically caused by munitions or their effects whether self-inflicted or 
resulting from enemy or friendly fire or by ground mishap, encountered during combat 
operations [21].”  By this definition, essentially any damage or malfunction encountered 
during combat operations is battle damage.  Consequently, commanders may use ABDR 
techniques to repair essentially any problem to which they are applicable.  For example, 
while deployed, an aircraft tire fails and damages the adjacent landing gear door.  In this 
case, a commander, at his/her discretion, may use ABDR techniques to repair the landing 
gear door.  ABDR techniques are not applicable to the tire and, consequently, the commander 
cannot use them for its repair.  The intent of this broad battle damage definition is to provide 
deployed Commanders rapid repair options, which maintain safety and effectiveness—
regardless of what caused the damage.  The unintended consequence of the wordy definition 
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is that it makes it difficult for a technician to decide whether to send an AFTO 97 to 
SURVIAC or not.  In this regard, the term battle damage may be too all encompassing.  
Therefore, to correct the deficiencies identified in TO 1-1H-39, the author recommends the 
following changes.  In section 1 of TO 1-1H-39, the current verbiage states:  
“Battle damage is defined as any damage and/or malfunction, typically caused by munitions 
or their effects whether self-inflicted or resulting from enemy or friendly fire or by ground 
mishap, encountered during combat operations.  Use of advanced weapons, along 
with…[21]”   
 
The author recommends amending the verbiage to state:  
“Battle damage is defined as damage sustained during combat operations.  Battle damage 
may be broken into two categories—combat damage and mishap damage.  Use of 
advanced…” 
 
This change accomplishes multiple things.  It is concise and; therefore, less confusing.  It 
removes any doubt that mishap damage can be considered battle damage if sustained during 
combat.  It also maintains the flexibility commanders require for applying ABDR techniques 
to situations other than combat hostile fire damage. 
TO 1-1H-39 also contains a decision matrix used to determine if an AFTO Form 97 is 
required to document a particular damage event.  Similar to the battle damage definition, the 
decision matrix needs improvement.  TO 1-1H-39 Section 1-12, Table 1-2, Note 2 states: 
 “Combat damage includes all damages and malfunctions caused by munitions or their 
effects whether self-inflicted or resulting from enemy or friendly fire [21].” 
 
The goal of this note is to define combat damage so the technicians can in-turn, determine if 
their particular damage warrants an AFTO Form 97.  The following change is a better 
alternative.  Note 2 should read:  
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“Combat damage includes all damages and malfunctions caused by munitions or their effects 
whether from enemy fire, friendly fire, or self-inflicted.” 
 
 Similarly, the current verbiage of note 3 states:  
“Mishaps include such items as an aircraft coming in contact with vehicles, shelters, support 
equipment, etc, mid-air collisions, maintenance accidents, cash landings not resulting from 
combat damage, etc [21].”    
 
The recommended verbiage states:  
“Mishaps include damage and/or malfunctions not considered combat damage or normal wear 
such as: aircraft coming in contact with ground based objects, mid-air collisions, maintenance 
accidents, etc.” 
[Note: TO 1-1H-39, Section 1-12, has an error.  It states, “Table 1-1 describes…” it should read, 
“Table 1-2…”] 
The recommendations to TO 1-1H-39 intend to clarify instructions for reporting battle 
damage.  However, these improvements are only helpful if a technician is steered to them in the 
first place.  As shown in this thesis, there are chinks in the maintenance documentation chain 
when battle damage is involved.  The problem begins in TO 00-20-1, AEROSPACE 
EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE INSPECTION, DOCUMENTATION, POLICIES, AND 
PROCEDURES.  TO 00-20-1 implements the documentation policies of AFI 21-101, 
AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT.  As such, it lays the 
foundation on which all requirements for reporting aircraft maintenance is built.  In TO 00-20-1, 
battle damage is mentioned in three distinct locations: Appendix C, the acronym list; Appendix 
B, Applicable Technical Orders; and Section 5.9 where, correctly, the user is instructed to refer to 
TO 1-1H-39 for instructions on reporting battle damage [36].  However, TO 00-20-1 does not 
mention the special form used to report battle damage.  Therefore, the following recommended 
additions to TO 00-20-1 will increase the probability that maintainers will capture battle damage 
appropriately.  Section 3.1.1 of TO 00-20-1 provides a list of forms used to document 
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maintenance discrepancies and corrective actions.  Therefore, the recommended change inserts 
the AFTO Form 97 and 97A used to document battle damage and repairs, respectively.  The 
verbiage is as follows: 
“3.1.1.4 AFTO FORM 97, AEROSPACE VEHICLE BATTLE DAMAGE INCIDENT 
DEBRIEF/ASSESSMENT RECORD” 
“3.1.1.5 AFTO FORM 97A, AEROSPACE VEHICLE BATTLE DAMAGE 
ASSESSMENT/REPAIR RECORD” 
 
The point of the change is to make battle damage reporting as similar to other maintenance 
documentation acts as possible.  Additionally, Section 3.11 of TO 00-20-1 addresses how to file 
the forms listed.  Thus, the author recommends adding a note in this section, which directs the 
user to TO 1-1H-39 for specific documentation instructions.  The verbiage states: “AFTO Form 
97/97A shall be filed IAW TO 1-1H-39.” 
Likewise, TO 00-20-2 MAINTENANCE DATA DOCUMENTATION requires revision.  
TO 00-20-2 intends to provide a better understanding of the objectives, scope, concept, and 
policy of Maintenance Data Documentation (MDD).  TO 00-20-2 communicates greater detail 
about the specific systems used to capture maintenance data—in accordance with TO 00-20-1.  
Like TO 00-20-1, TO 00-20-2 there is only limited mention of battle damage.  Specifically, TO 
00-20-2 mentions battle damage in Appendix G, HOW MALFUNCTION CODES.  There is no 
mention of TO 1-1H-39 whatsoever.  Because TO 00-20-2 intends to provide a higher 
understanding of MDD, it is critical that the following addition be made.  Section 4.22.1.7 should 
state: 
“4.22.1.7 HMC 731 (battle damage) will be used whenever a job involves corrective action as a 
result of battle damage as defined by TO 1-1H-39.  Aircraft Battle Damage and Repair (ABDR) 
actions shall be documented IAW TO 1-1H-39.” 
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The intent of this addition is to drive a technician to the unique reporting requirements of battle 
damage as explained in TO 1-1H-39.   
The recommendations to this point mainly involve improvements to routine maintenance 
documentation processes.  However, this thesis highlights the potential for battle damage to go 
unreported when technicians assistance seek from the responsible engineering authority.  TO 00-
25-107 MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE, governs this process.  Therefore, it is imperative that 
this technical order addresses the unique nature of battle damage and its required documentation.  
Hence, the author recommends the addition of the following to TO 00-25-107:   
<FOLLOWING PARA 1.4 ADD> 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Weapon System Specific ABDR Manual Revision Recommendations 
The preceding recommendations address the deficiencies in general battle damage reporting 
policies.  The recommendations to follow address deficiencies in weapon system specific repair 
manuals.  Technicians use the two specific manuals listed for standard structural repairs and 
weapon system specific ABDR repairs.  The structural repair manual is listed because the 
majority of battle damage will likely involve some form of structural damage.  Therefore, to 
increase the probability that a technician records the subject battle damage appropriately, this is 
the most logical choice.  The author also chose the weapon system specific ABDR manual 
because if a mechanical system is to be repaired using ABDR techniques technicians must 
NOTE 
MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE REQUESTS INVOLVING BATTLE DAMAGE 
SHALL BE DOCUMENTED IAW TO 1-1H-39. 
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reference it.  Therefore, these two weapon system specific manuals will most often prompt the 
user to record battle damage accordingly.  While the C-130 is the subject of the 
recommendations below, weapon system managers should explore similar amendments for all 
other combat aircraft. 
The first recommendation involves the C-130 specific ABDR manual, TO 1C-130A-39.  In 
this manual, there is no mention of the requirement to uniquely document battle damage.  
Therefore, the USAF should add the following statement to the foreword section, which already 
exists.  The addition states: “Battle damage shall be documented IAW TO 1-1H-39.”  Likewise, 
the USAF should add this statement to the foreword section of TO 1C-130A-3, the C-130 
structural repair manual. 
5.3 Mid-term Battle Damage Documentation Recommendations 
While the recommendations set forth in Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter correct many of the 
deficiencies in the current battle damage reporting process, they are by no means a complete 
solution.  For the mid-term, the battle damage reporting process as a whole needs evaluation.  A 
simple, yet effective, solution for many of the battle damage reporting woes outlined within this 
thesis is wider adoption of the Combat Damage Incident Reporting System (CDIRS).  SURVIAC 
developed CDIRS for SURVIAC [35].  Why then is CDIRS not the preferred battle damage 
input method for all Department of Defense (DoD) agencies—not just JCAT?  Maintenance 
operations should institutionalize CDIRS for aircraft battle damage in the same way that they use 
other management information systems (MIS) for typical maintenance data.  In essence, the 
CDIRS interface would become an electronic AFTO Form 97 except with considerably more 
functionality such as the ability to upload pictures.  Paper AFTO Form 97s would still be 
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available for organizations without the necessary connectivity.  Commanders could also use a 
CDIRS AFTO Form 97 interface to access recent battle damage information and enable more 
responsive decisions  In a rapidly evolving threat environment this capability is invaluable.  The 
possibilities are endless.  Most importantly, users will be able to upload higher fidelity 
information.  Ultimately, the widespread use of CDIRS will improve the quality of battle damage 
analysis.   
Developing the “CDIRS AFTO Form 97” interface is only the beginning.  The system is 
useless if no one knows about it.  Therefore, the USAF should update TOs 00-20-1, 00-20-2, and 
1-1H-39, discussed previously, to reflect the existence of the CDIRS AFTO Form 97 and 
provide, at least, the same level of detail with regard to its importance and purpose as it provides 
on other systems.  Finally, SURVIAC should populate the CDIRS database with historical data 
such as “The Study of Rotorcraft Survivability.”  Proper training, an electronic AFTO Form 97 
interface, and ready access to invaluable historical data will prompt a quantum leap in 
survivability analysis.  Lives will be saved as a result. 
5.4 Long-term Battle Damage Documentation 
Simply reporting combat damage incidents is not enough to improve aircraft survivability.  
The DoD must improve the quality of the reports.  Therefore, battle damage reporting must be 
normalized across the DoD.  To accomplish this goal, within the Air Force, it should staff 
maintenance operations with personnel trained to assess aircraft battle damage in a manner 
similar to the Joint Combat Assessment Team (JCAT).  With these personnel in place, the level 
of fidelity reported for a combat damage incident will increase tremendously.  Furthermore, the 
DoD should mandate these personnel are current and proficient in combat damage incident 
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reporting prior to deploying.  This all but guarantees qualified assessors are in place where and 
when battle damage occurs.     
5.5 Conclusion 
It bears repeating that war is the ultimate test of survivability.  At this point in history, the 
agencies of the Department of Defense have proven themselves excellent students.  In 
survivability, one cannot rest on the strengths of yesterday because an adversary is constantly 
looking for the weaknesses of tomorrow.  Roughly a century after the implementation of fixed-
wing aircraft as an instrument of war, ballistic projectiles remain a relevant threat.  Therefore, the 
survivability community should focus significant research and development on the phenomena 
of hydrodynamic ram.  The defense industry needs high-fidelity modeling tools; material 
solutions that can be easily retrofitted into existing weapon systems; and design guidelines for 
future systems that minimize the effects of hydrodynamic ram.  Doing so ensures combat aircraft 
will be prepared for the survivability tests of the future.  
When operating in a non-permissive threat environment, aircraft are going to sustain battle 
damage.  Therefore, it is vital that the USAF retains a rigorous aircraft battle damage repair 
(ABDR) capability.  The current ABDR trend introduces the potential for a critical vulnerability.  
The USAF is losing the experience and skills necessary to provide ABDR and when it is gone, it 
is lost forever.  Furthermore, the dissolution of the Combat Logistics Support Squadron (CLSS) 
is completely contrary to the AEF vision.  The USAF needs to completely reinvigorate its ABDR 
program and prepare for the battlefield of the future.  Furthermore, the USAF needs to develop 
technologies that enable rapid and effective repair of stealthy materials, imbedded electronics 
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and sensors, and modern aircraft structure.  Assuming air superiority is going to be a given in 
future wars is reckless, indeed.     
Last, but by no means least, when the current battles in OEF and OIF have gone cold and the 
next battle is begun, it is absolutely crucial that the USAF (and other DoD agencies) has in place 
the ability to accurately capture aircraft battle damage.  If this is not accomplished—soon—the 
USAF runs the risk of missing relevant data that may result in unnecessary loss of life.         
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